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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Income is a key determinant of consumer choice. A crucial dimension through which purchasing
power inuences this choice is the quality of consumption. People with very di¤erent incomes
tend to consume commodities within the same category of goods, such as clothes, cars, wines, etc.
However, the actual quality of the consumed commodities di¤ers substantially when comparing
poorer to richer households. The same reasoning naturally extends to countries with di¤erent
levels of income per capita. In this case, the quality dimension of consumption entails important
implications on the evolution of trade ows.
Several recent studies have investigated the links between quality of consumption and interna-
tional trade. One strand of literature has centred their attention on the demand side, nding a
strong positive correlation between quality of imports and the importers income per head [Hallak
(2006), Fieler (2012)].1 Another set of papers has focused instead on whether exporters adjust the
quality of their production to serve markets with di¤erent income levels. The evidence here also
points towards the presence of nonhomothetic preferences along the quality dimension, showing
that producers sell higher quality versions of their output to richer importers.2
These empirical ndings have motivated a number of models that yield trade patterns where
richer importers buy high-quality versions of goods, while exporters di¤erentiate the quality of
their output by income at destination [Hallak (2010), Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011),
Jaimovich and Merella (2012)]. Yet, this literature has approached the determinants of countries
sectoral specialisation as a phenomenon that is independent of the process of quality upgrading
resulting from higher consumer incomes. In this paper, we propose a theory where quality up-
grading in consumption becomes the central driving force behind a general process of sectoral
specialisation and comparative advantage intensication. The crucial novel feature of our theory
is that quality upgrading by consumers leads to a strengthening in countriesspecialisation in the
sectors where they exhibit a relative cost advantage. Therefore, the quality of the goods consumed
and exchanged in world markets becomes a rst-order determinant of the evolution of countries
sectoral specialisation, and of the intensity of the trade links that importers establish with di¤erent
1See also related evidence in Choi et al. (2009), Francois and Kaplan (1996) and Dalgin et al. (2008).
2For example, Verhoogen (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) provide evidence of Mexican manufacturing
plants selling higher qualities in the US than in their local markets. Brooks (2006) establishes the same results for
Colombian manufacturing plants, and Manova and Zhang (2012) show that Chinese rms ship higher qualities of
their exports to richer importers. Analogous evidence is provided by Bastos and Silva (2010) for Portuguese rms,
and by Crino and Epifani (2012) for Italian ones.
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exporters.
Our theory is grounded on the hypothesis that productivity di¤erentials are stronger for higher-
quality goods, combined with the notion that willingness to pay for quality rises with income.
Within this framework, we show that international specialisation and sectoral trade intensify over
the growth path. The evolution of trade ows featured by our model presents novel specicities
that stem from the interaction between nonhomothetic preferences and the deepening of sectoral
productivity di¤erentials at higher levels of quality. In particular, the process of quality upgrading
with rising income sets in motion simultaneous demand-driven and supply-driven factors, which
together lead to a rise in specialisation by importers and exporters. Import and export speciali-
sation arise as intertwined phenomena because, as countries become richer, consumers shift their
spending towards high-quality goods, which are exactly those that tend to display greater scope
for international trade.
We model a world economy with a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated goods, each of them
available in a continuum of vertically ordered quality levels. Each country produces a particular
variety of each good. The production technology di¤ers both across countries and sectors. We
assume that some countries are intrinsically better than others in producing certain types of goods.
In addition, these intrinsic productivity di¤erentials on the horizontal dimension tend to become
increasingly pronounced along the vertical dimension. These assumptions lead to an intensifying
process of sectoral specialisation as production moves up on the quality ladders of each good. For
example, a country may have a cost advantage in producing wine, while another country may have
it in whisky. This would naturally lead them to exchange these two goods. Yet, in our model,
productivity di¤erences in the wine and whisky industries do not remain constant along the quality
space, but become more intense as production moves up towards higher quality versions of these
goods. As a result, the scope for international trade turns out to be wider for high-quality wines
and whiskies than for low-quality ones.
A key feature of our model is the embedded link between nonhomotheticities in quality and
international trade at the sectoral level. More precisely, as richer individuals upgrade the quality
of their consumption baskets, sectoral productivity di¤erentials across countries become stronger,
leading to the intensication of some trading partnerships and the weakening of others. In that
respect, our model suggests that the study of the evolution of trade links may require considering
a more exible concept of comparative advantage than the one traditionally used in the literature,
so as to encompass quality upgrading as an inherent part of it. In the literature of Ricardian
trade, the comparative advantage is univocally determined by exporterstechnologies. This paper
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instead sustains that both the importersincomes and the exporterssectoral productivities must
be jointly taken into account in order to establish a rank of comparative advantage. This is because
the degree of comparative advantage between any two countries is crucially a¤ected by the quality
of consumption. As a consequence, richer and poorer importers may end up establishing trade
links of substantially di¤erent intensity with the same set of exporters, simply because the gaps
between their willingness-to-pay for quality may translate into unequal degrees of comparative
advantage across their trade partners.
The conditionality of comparative advantage on importers incomes entails novel testable pre-
dictions on the evolution of sectoral trade ows. In particular, our model predicts that the share
of imports originating from exporters exhibiting a cost advantage in a given good must grow with
the income per head of the importer. This is the result of richer importers buying high-quality
versions of goods, which are those for which cost di¤erentials across countries are relatively more
pronounced. Using bilateral trade data at the sectoral level, we provide evidence consistent with
the prediction that richer economies are more likely to buy their imports from producers who
display a comparative advantage in the imported goods.
Finally, our theory also has implications in terms of policy, particularly with regard to stimu-
lating the growth of a specic industry in the economy through import tari¤s or subsidies to local
producers. Using simple comparative statics, we show that the gains from free trade are stronger
for more developed economies, as their consumers su¤er a greater welfare loss when the tari¤ is
imposed on more e¢ cient producers. In addition, our results suggest that subsidies have a larger
impact at fostering local production when introduced in developing countries.
Related Literature
Nonhomothetic preferences are by now a widespread modelling choice in the trade literature.
However, most of the past trade literature with nonhomotheticities has focused either on vertical
di¤erentiation [e.g., Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997)]
or horizontal di¤erentiation in consumption [e.g., Markusen (1986), Bergstrand (1990) and Mat-
suyama (2000)].3 Two recent articles have combined vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation with
3For some recent contributions with horizontal di¤erentiation and nonhomothetic preferences see: Foellmi, Hep-
enstrick and Zweimuller (2012) and Tarasov (2012), where consumers are subject to a discrete consumption choice;
Fieler (2011) who ties the income elasticity of consumption goods across di¤erent industries to the elasticity of
substitution of goods within the same industry; Simonovska (2015) who xes a bounded level of utility for each
di¤erentiated good; Breinlich and Cuñat (2013) who combine a Stone-Geary representation with Armington aggre-
gators of country-specic varieties; and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Zhelobodko et al. (2012) and Dhingra and
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preferences featuring income-dependent willingness to pay for quality: Fajgelbaum, Grossman and
Helpman (2011) and Jaimovich and Merella (2012).
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) analyse how di¤erences in income distributions between economies
with access to the same technologies determine trade ows in the presence of increasing returns and
trade costs. Like ours, their paper leads to an endogenous emergence of comparative advantages,
which may have remained initially latent (in their case, this could be either due to trade costs being
too high to allow trade, or countriesincome distributions being too similar to induce specialisation
via a home-market e¤ect). Our paper, instead, sticks to the Ricardian tradition where trade
and specialisation stem from cross-country di¤erences in sectoral technologies featuring constant
returns to scale. In particular, in our model, comparative advantages and trade emerge gradually,
not because trade costs may initially hinder the scope for exchange in the presence of increasing
returns to scale, but because the demand for commodities displaying wider heterogeneity in cost
of production (the high-quality goods) expands as incomes rise.4
Jaimovich and Merella (2012) also propose a nonhomothetic preference specication where
budget reallocations take place both within and across horizontally di¤erentiated goods. That pa-
per, however, remained within a standard Ricardian framework where absolute and comparative
advantages are determined from the outset, and purely by technological conditions. Hence, nonho-
mothetic preferences play no essential role there in determining export and import specialisation
at di¤erent levels of development. By contrast, it is the interaction between rising di¤erences in
productivity at higher quality levels and nonhomotheticities in quality that generates our novel
results in terms of co-evolution of export and import specialisation.
A key assumption in our theory is the widening in productivity di¤erentials at higher levels of
quality. To the best of our knowledge, Alcala (2012) is the only other paper that has explicitly
introduced a similar feature into a Ricardian model of trade. An important di¤erence between
the two papers is that Alcalas keeps the homothetic demand structure presented in Dornbusch,
Fisher and Samuelson (1977) essentially intact. Nonhomotheticities in demand are actually crucial
to our story and, in particular, to its main predictions regarding the evolution of trade ows and
specialisation at di¤erent levels of income.
Finally, Fieler (2011) also studies the interplay between nonhomothetic demand and Ricardian
Morrow (2012), who adopt non-homothetic specications of preferences delivering linear demand systems.
4 In this regard, an important feature present in our model is that high-quality versions of goods are inherently
more tradable than low-quality ones, while this is not necessarily the case in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) unless they
specically assume quality-specic trade costs that are restricted to be relatively lower for high-quality varieties.
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technological disparities. She shows that, when productivity di¤erences are stronger for goods with
high income elasticity, her model matches quite closely key features of North-North and North-
South trade. While her model exhibits horizontal di¤erentiation, it does not display vertical
di¤erentiation, which is a crucial dimension exploited by our model. Our mechanism di¤ers from
hers in that the e¤ects of demand on trade ows stem from the (vertical) reallocation of consumer
spending within categories of goods rather than (horizontally) across them. In particular, our
results hinge on richer consumers switching their good-specic expenditure shares from lower-
quality to higher-quality versions of the goods. It is in fact this within-good substitution process
that leads to our main predictions where spending shares across di¤erent exporters of the same
good change with the income of the importer.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 studies a world economy with a
continuum of countries where all economies have the same level of income per head in equilibrium.
Section 3 generalises the main results to a world economy where some countries are richer than
others. Section 4 presents some empirical results consistent with the main predictions of our model.
Section 5 provides some further discussion in terms of policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
All relevant proofs can be found in the Appendices.
2 A world economy with equally rich countries
We study a world economy with a unit continuum of countries indexed by v. In each country there
is a continuum of individuals with unit mass. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labour
time. We assume labour is immobile across countries. In addition, we assume all countries are
open to international trade, and there are no trading costs of any sort.
All countries share a common commodity space dened along three distinct dimensions: a
horizontal, a varietal, and a vertical dimension. Concerning the horizontal dimension, there exists
a unit continuum of di¤erentiated goods, indexed by z. In terms of the varietal dimension, we
assume that each country v produces a specic variety v of each good z. Finally, our vertical
dimension refers to the intrinsic quality of the commodity: we assume that a continuum of di¤erent
qualities q  1 are potentially available for each good z.5
5To x ideas, the horizontal dimension refers to di¤erent types of goods, such as cars, wines, co¤ee beans, etc.
The varietal dimension refers to the di¤erent varieties of any given type of good, originating from di¤erent countries,
such as Spanish and French wines (di¤ering, for instance, in specic traits like the types of grapes and regional
vinication techniques). The vertical dimension refers to the intrinsic quality of each specic commodity (e.g., the
ageing and the grapes selection in the winemaking).
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Our model will display two main distinctive features. First, productivity di¤erentials across
countries will rise with the quality level of the commodities being produced. Second, richer in-
dividuals will choose to consume higher-quality commodities than poorer ones. The next two
subections specify the functional forms of production technologies and consumer utility that we
adopt to generate these two features.
2.1 Production technologies
In each country v there exists a continuum of rms that may transform local labour into a variety
v of good z. Production technologies are idiosyncratic both to the sector z and to the country v.
In order to produce one unit of commodity z at the quality level q, a rm from country v needs to
use  z;v (q) units of labour, where:
 z;v (q) =
A
1 + 
qz;v : (1)
Unit labour requirements contain two key technological parameters. The rst is  > 0, which
applies identically to all sectors and countries, and we interpret it as the worldwide total factor
productivity level. As such, in our model, increases in  will capture the e¤ects of aggregate growth
and rising real incomes. The second is z;v, which may di¤er both across z and v, and governs
the elasticity of the labour requirements with respect to quality upgrading. In what follows, we
assume that each parameter z;v is independently drawn from a probability density function with
uniform distribution over the interval

; 

. In addition, we assume that  > 1. Hence,  z;v (q)
are always strictly increasing and convex in q. The term A  e ( 1)=( 1) is simply a scale factor
between labour input units and quality units, introduced for mathematical convenience.
An important feature implicit in the functional form of (1) is that cross-country sectoral pro-
ductivity di¤erentials will widen with the level of quality of production. This feature will in turn
imply that the cost advantage of countries with better sectoral productivity draws will expand at
higher levels of quality of production.
Let wv denote henceforth the wage per unit of labour time in country v. We assume that, in
all countries and all sectors, rms face no entry costs. In equilibrium, all commodities will then be
priced exactly at their unit cost. Hence, the variety of good z in quality q produced by country v
will be sold (internationally) at price:
pz;v (q) =
Awv
1 + 
qz;v . (2)
Notice from (2) that changes in  leave all relative prices unaltered. In this regard, we may
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consider a rise in total factor productivity  as resulting in a pure increase in real income, entailing
no substitution e¤ect across the di¤erent commodities.
2.2 Utility function and budget constraint
To simplify the analysis, we introduce the following assumption concerning consumer choice:
Assumption 1 (Selection of quality) Individuals consume a strictly positive amount of (at
most) one quality version of each good z produced by country v.
Assumption 1 is analogous to assuming an innite elasticity of substitution across di¤erent quality
versions of the good z sourced from country v. Henceforth, to ease notation, we denote the selected
quality of the good z sourced from country v by qz;v. In addition, we denote by cz;v the consumed
physical quantity of the selected quality qz;v.
Utility is dened over the consumed quantities cz;v in the selected qualities qz;v. Formally:
U =
Z
Z
Z
V
ln (cz;v)
qz;v dv

dz
 1

; where  < 0: (3)
Individuals choose the quantity to consume for each selected quality, subject to the budget
constraint: Z
Z
Z
V
pz;v (qz;v) cz;v dv

dz  w, (4)
where each pz;v (qz;v) in (4) is given by the price functions (2) when q is equal to the selected
quality qz;v.
The utility function (3) displays a number of features that are worth discussing in detail. Firstly,
considering the quality dimension in isolation, the exponential terms (cz;v)
qz;v in (3) are instrumen-
tal to obtaining our desired non-homothetic behaviour along the quality space. The exponential
form implies that, whenever cz;v > 1, the magnifying e¤ect of quality becomes increasingly impor-
tant as cz;v rises. Such non-homothetic feature in turn leads to a solution of the consumer problem
where higher incomes will translate into quality upgrading of consumption. Secondly, abstracting
now from the quality dimension, (3) features two nested CES functions. On the one hand, for each
good z, the (inner) logarithmic function implies a unit elasticity of substitution across varieties of
the same good z. On the other hand, the parameter  < 0 governs the elasticity of substitution
across goods, which is equal to 1= (1  ) < 1. Thus, the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent
goods is smaller than within goods (i.e., across the di¤erent varieties of the same good).
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2.3 Utility maximisation
Consider a representative individual (in a generic country) with income w. The consumers problem
requires maximising (3) subject to (4). This is a problem that could be in principle solved in terms
of physical quantities of consumption for each good. However, Assumption 1 allows us to easily
re-state the problem in terms of two other variables that we will henceforth use: selected qualities
and budget allocations. More precisely, denoting by z;v the share of income spent in the good z
sourced from country v, by using Assumption 1 we may write:
cz;v =
z;v w
pz;v(qz;v)
; (5)
where, again, the expression pz;v (qz;v) in (5) is given by the price functions (2) with q = qz;v.
In the next sections, we will study how the intensity of sectoral trade partnerships change at
di¤erent levels of consumer income within a full general equilibrium framework. However, before
moving on to that framework, it proves useful to present the formal solution of the consumer
problem in the specic case when the wage is the same for all countries; that is, when wv = w for
all v. This will allow us to convey some preliminary intuition for the mechanism underlying the
general equilibrium results presented later on.6
Lemma 1 (Optimal selected quality and budget allocation) When all countries have the
same wage, for each good z produced in country v the consumer chooses the level of quality:
qz;v =

(1 + ) =A
ez;vQ
1=(z;v 1)
; (6)
and spends the share of income:
z;v =

(1 + ) =A
(eQ)z;v
1=(z;v 1)
; (7)
where the variable Q  RZ RV qz;v dv dz in the denominator of (6) and (7) denotes the average
quality of the optimal consumption bundle chosen by the consumer.
Lemma 1 characterises the solution of the consumers problem in terms of two sets of variables:
the expressions in (6), which stipulate the quality level in which each variety of every good is
optimally consumed; the expressions in (7), describing the optimal expenditure shares allocated
to those commodities. An important implication of Lemma 1 is the implicit link between optimal
budget shares and optimal qualities. In particular, plugging (6) into (7) yields z;v = qz;v=Q.
6The next section shows that, in this symmetric specication of the model, all wages will in any case turn out
to be equal in equilibrium. As a consequence, there is no loss of generality by preliminarily proceeding to study the
optimum of the consumer problem when wv = w for all v.
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Lemma 2 (Nonhomotheticity in quality of consumption) The selected quality of the con-
sumed goods rises as the real income of the consumer increases; that is: @qz;v=@ > 0. Further-
more, the process of quality upgrading is more pronounced for the varieties of the good sourced from
countries that can more easily improve its quality; that is: @2qz;v=
 
@ @z;v

< 0.
Lemma 2 summarises the key nonhomothetic aspect present in our model: quality upgrading
of consumption. From the result @qz;v=@ > 0 it follows that, as real incomes grow with a rising ,
individuals substitute lower-quality versions of every good z by better versions of them.7 Moreover,
the cross-derivative @2qz;v=
 
@ @z;v

< 0 implies that the quality rise is faster for commodities
supplied by countries that received better sectoral productivity draws (i.e., lower values of ).
Jointly considered, the two lemmas underlie the main source of interaction between supply and
demand sides that we will exploit in our general equilibrium analysis: as  grows, producers better
able at upgrading quality in a particular sector will gradually attract larger world expenditure
shares in that sector.
2.4 General equilibrium
In equilibrium, total world spending on commodities produced in country v must equal the total
labour income in country v. Denoting by iz;v the expenditure share by importer i in the variety
of good z produced in country v, we may write down the market clearing condition as follows:Z
Z
Z
V
iz;v wi di dz = wv; (8)
where wi refers to the income of country i.
More formally, an equilibrium in the world economy is given by a set of wages wv for each
country v such that: i) prices of all traded commodities are determined by (2); ii) all consumers in
the world choose their commodity spending by maximising (3) subject to (4); and iii) the market
clearing conditions stipulated in (8) hold simultaneously for all countries.
In this world economy, the ex-ante symmetry across countries implies that, in equilibrium, all
country wages wv will always turn out to be equal to each other. Thus, we can simply write that
wv = w, for any level of  > 0.8 The reason for this result is the following: as  rises, and real
7As we mentioned at the end of Section 2.1, variations in  a¤ect all prices in (2) in the same proportion, leaving
all relative prices unchanged. Thus, a rise in  leads consumers to upgrade their quality of consumption via a pure
income-e¤ect. In fact, a rise in  entails the same e¤ects as an exogenous increase of w (in that regard, the parameter
 plays a role that is isomorphic to that of the units of e¢ ciency labour available to each individual).
8For a formal proof of this result, see Proposition 5 in the Online Appendix.
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incomes accordingly increase, aggregate demands and supplies grow together at identical speed
in all countries. As a consequence, markets clearing conditions in (8) will constantly hold true
without the need of any adjustment in relative wages across economies.
The fact that relative wages remain constant over the path of development conceals the fact
that, as  increases, economies actually experience signicant changes in their consumption and
production structures at the sectoral level. Such sectoral reallocations stem from the interplay
of demand and supply side factors. On the demand side, as real incomes grow with a rising ,
individuals consume higher quality versions of each commodity as can be observed from (6). On
the supply side, heterogeneities in sectoral labour productivities across countries become stronger
as producers raise the quality of their output as can be gleaned from (1). As we will formally show
next, the interplay between income-dependent willingness to pay for quality and intensication of
sectoral productivity di¤erences at higher levels of quality leads to a process of ever increasing
sectoral specialisation as  rises.
2.5 Sectoral specialisation
We study now the e¤ects of the above-mentioned sectoral reallocations on the sectoral trade ows.
With regards to the demand side of the economy, we examine the import penetration (IP) of good
z sourced from country v by country i, dened as:
IP iz;v 
M iz;v
M iz
; (9)
where M iz;v denotes the value of imports of good z sourced from country v, and M
i
z is the total
value of imports of good z (the superindex i refers to the country that purchases these goods).
For the supply side, we consider the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of country v in
sector z. Formally:
RCAz;v  Xz;v=Xv
Wz=W
: (10)
In the numerator of (10), Xz;v denotes the value of exports of good z by country v, and Xv the
value of total exports by country v. In the denominator of (10), Wz refers to the value of exports
of good z worldwide, and W represents the value of total exports in the world.
Lemma 3 (Import penetration and revealed comparative advantage) In a world econo-
my where all countries have the same income, for every variety v of good z, the measures of import
penetration and revealed comparative advantage equal the share of income spent on that commodity.
Formally:
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1. For any importer i of variety v of good z: IP iz;v = z;v.
2. For any exporter v of good z: RCAz;v = z;v.
In our symmetric world economy, the revealed comparative advantage of country v in good
z and the import penetration of variety v of good z mirror one another. This is the result of
all countries displaying the same income (coupled with individuals having the same preferences
worldwide and the absence of trade costs) which entails that all consumers will choose exactly the
same optimal consumption bundle. The next proposition shows how these measures of bilateral
trade ows relate to countriessectoral productivity draws, and how they evolve as real incomes
rise in the world economy.
Proposition 1 In a world economy where all countries have the same income, the degree of spe-
cialisation in sector z is larger for countries that received better sectoral productivity draws in that
sector. In addition, sectoral specialisation intensies as the real incomes of individuals increase.
Formally, for any sector z and any pair of countries v0 and v00 such that z;v0 < z;v00:
1. z;v0 > z;v00. Therefore, RCAz;v0 > RCAz;v00, and IP
i
z;v0 > IP
i
z;v00 for any importer i.
2.
@z;v0
@ >
@z;v00
@ . Thus,
@(RCAz;v0 RCAz;v00)
@ > 0, and
@

IP i
z;v0 IP iz;v00

@ > 0 for any importer i.
Proposition 1 merges together supply side and demand side results. It rstly describes how
export and import specialisation relate to the sectoral productivity draws, and secondly it shows
how both measures evolve as real incomes grow with a rising value of .
From a supply side perspective, Proposition 1 states that the RCA in sector z are monotonically
linked to the sectoral productivity draws z;v: countries that receive better draws for sector z
exhibit a higher RCA in that sector. More importantly, the second result in the proposition shows
that this gap further intensies as  rises. This last result is what we interpret as increasing export
specialisation along the growth path.
From a demand side perspective, Proposition 1 may be interpreted in terms of increasing import
specialisation along the growth path. More precisely, the result that @(IP iz;v0   IP iz;v00)=@ > 0
means that, as consumers get richer, we observe a process of growing import penetration of the
varieties of z produced by exporters who enjoy a higher RCA in sector z.
The joint consideration of these two arguments suggests that, over the path of development,
countries with a cost advantage in a given sector will increasingly specialise in that sector. At
the same time, these countries will also attract a growing share of the world spending in that
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particular sector. Intuitively, as world consumers raise the quality of their consumption when
 grows, sectoral productivity di¤erentials across countries widen up, leading to an increase in
sectoral trade specialisation. Interestingly, this process takes place both at the importer and at
the exporter level. In this regard, a central prediction of our model is the implicit secular tendency
of sectoral trade ows to gravitate towards exporters with a rising cost advantage in the sector.
This, in turn, means that while some bilateral sectoral trade links will intensify during the path
of development, others will gradually fade.9
3 A world economy with cross-country inequality
The previous section has dealt with a world economy where all countries exhibit the same real in-
come, while we let the worldwide total factor productivity parameter  increase. Such an analytical
framework allowed us to portray the behaviour of sectoral trade ows (and sectoral specialisation
patterns) within a world economy where countries shared a common growth path.
In this section, we slightly modify the previous setup to give room for cross-country inequality.
To keep the focus as clean as possible (departing from Section 2) we now hold constant the para-
meter . More importantly, we no longer force sectoral productivity di¤erentials to be drawn from
the same probability distribution function, which was the ultimate reason leading to equal equilib-
rium wages. This alternative setup allows us to generalise the previous results concerning export
specialisation to a case in which productivity di¤erentials and cost di¤erentials may not always
coincide (as a result of equilibrium wages that di¤er across countries). In addition, introducing
cross-country inequality leads to more powerful predictions concerning import penetration (of the
di¤erent export sources) at di¤erent income levels, which we will contrast with cross-sectional data
of bilateral trade ows in Section 4.
We keep the same commodity space and preference structure as those previously used in Section
2. However, we now assume that the world is composed by two subsets of countries. We will refer
to the two subsets as region H and region L and, whenever it proves convenient, to a generic
country by h or l, respectively. We let countries in H and L di¤er from each other in that they
face di¤erent random generating processes for their sectoral productivity parameters. For any
country h, we assume that z;h for each good z is independently drawn from a uniform density
9The equilibrium characterised in this section has the particular feature that revealed comparative advantages
coincide with the import penetrations. This is clearly a very specic result that hinges on the assumed symmetry in
the distributions of sector-specic productivities across countries. The next section shows that this is no longer the
case when we introduce some asymmetry across countries.
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function with support

; 

, where  > 1, just like before. Instead, for any country l, we assume
that z;l =  for every good z.
10
This alternative setup still features the fact that sectoral productivity di¤erentials become
increasingly pronounced at higher levels of quality. In addition, it also allows for the presence of
absolute advantages (at the aggregate level) across regions.11
The ex-ante symmetry across countries from the same region implies now that, in equilibrium,
wages of countries within that region must be equal. By contrast, wages in region H must neces-
sarily be higher than in region L. More formally, in equilibrium: wh = wh0 for any pair of countries
h; h0 2 H, and wl = wl0 for any l; l0 2 L, where wh > wl.12
The intuition for wh > wl is analogous to all Ricardian models of trade with absolute and
comparative advantages. Essentially, region H (which displays an absolute advantage over region
L) will enjoy higher wages than region L, since this is necessary to lower the production costs in L,
thereby allowing countries in L to export enough to countries in H and keep the trade balance in
equilibrium. Henceforth, without loss of generality, we take the wage in region L as the numeraire
of the economy. We accordingly set wl = 1, with wh hereafter denoting the relative wage between
region H and region L.
The rst set of results that di¤er qualitatively from those obtained in a world economy with
symmetric countries are to do with quality of consumption and quality of production. Consid-
ering the former, nonhomothetic preferences on the quality dimension imply that consumers in
H purchase higher quality consumption bundles than consumers in L. For the latter, the di¤er-
ence in wage between the two regions will distort the monotonicity between the monetary cost of
production and sectoral productivity draws (z;v) present throughout Section 2.
Proposition 2 In a two-region world economy with wh > 1:
1. Consumers from region H select higher quality versions than consumers from region L.
10None of our results hinge upon countries in region L drawing their sectoral productivity parameters from a
degenerate distribution. In the Appendix B, we extend the results of this section to a world economy with multiple
regions, and where all sectoral productivities are drawn from non-degenerate uniform distributions.
11Another way to introduce a source of absolute advantages into our framework would be by letting total factor
productivity be higher in region H than in region L, namely: h > l. Adding h > l to the aggregate productivity
gap resulting from the regionally di¤erent random generating processes for z;v would just reinforce the equilibrium
wage di¤erential between H and L, while it would not qualitatively change any of the main results obtained in this
section.
12For a formal proof of this result, see Proposition 6 in the Online Appendix.
14
2. All consumers set the level of quality highest for the varieties sourced from countries in
region H that received the best possible sectoral productivity draw, z;h = , and lowest for
the varieties sourced from countries in H that received the worst possible sectoral productivity
draw, z;h = . Furthermore, the quality level of varieties sourced from countries in region
L lies within those two extreme levels.
3. All consumers choose higher qualities for the varieties sourced from countries in region H
that received better sectoral productivity draws.
The rst result stems again from the rising willingness-to-pay for quality implied by (3): richer
consumers substitute lower-quality versions of each good z by higher-quality versions of them.
The second result shows that the highest quality of each good z, purchased by any consumer, is
produced in the country in region H that received the best possible draw, z;h = . Conversely,
the lowest quality of each good z, purchased by any consumer, is produced in the country in region
H that received the worst possible draw, z;h = . Notice that, although all countries in region L
also receive draws equal to , the lower labour cost there allows them to sell higher qualities than
the least e¢ cient producers in region H. Finally, the third result shows that, when considering
only commodities produced in region H, the quality of consumption is a monotonically decreasing
function of the elasticities of quality upgrading z;h. Intuitively, since all countries in region H
have the same wage, a larger z;h maps monotonically into a higher production cost (for a given
the level of quality), thus consumers worldwide nd it optimal to demand higher quality varieties
from countries with lower draws of z;h.
3.1 Export specialisation
Assume henceforth that a fraction  2 (0; 1) of all countries in the world belong to region H. We
proceed now to study the patterns of exportersspecialisation in this world economy with cross-
country inequality. We let Hz;h and 
L
z;h denote henceforth the expenditure share in the variety of
good z produced in country h by a consumer from region H and L, respectively.
Lemma 4 (Revealed comparative advantage in a world with cross-country inequality)
In a two-region world economy with wh > 1, the measures of revealed comparative advantage for a
generic good z are
1. for any country l:
RCAz;l = 1; (11)
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2. for any country h:
RCAz;h =
Hz;hwh + (1  )Lz;h
wh
: (12)
The result in (11) states that in every country in region L the revealed comparative advantages
are identical for all goods; this is the consequence of all sectors in those countries receiving the
exact same draw, z;l = . Revealed comparative advantages do vary though across countries in
region H. In particular, since Hz;h and 
L
z;h are decreasing functions of the sectoral productivity
draws z;h, (12) implies that the RCAz;h is also a decreasing function of z;h. Moreover, such
monotonicity of the demand intensities also means that the revealed comparative advantage of
the country belonging to H with draw  will turn out to be lower than that of any country in L.
Similarly, the revealed comparative advantage of the country belonging to H with draw  will be
higher than that of any country in L. These results are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let RCAz; and RCAz; denote the revealed comparative advantage in sector z
of countries in region H that received the best possible productivity draw, z;h = ; and the worst
possible productivity draw, z;h = , respectively. Then:
1. RCAz; < RCAz;l < RCAz;;
2. The revealed comparative advantage in sector z of country h is a decreasing function of the
sectoral productivity draw: @ (RCAz;h) =@z;h < 0.
The main result to draw from Proposition 3 is that the country (in region H) receiving the
best possible draw in sector z will display as well the highest revealed comparative advantage in
that sector. Notice that these countries are also those supplying the highest quality varieties of
good z, as shown in Proposition 2. Therefore, like in Section 2, countries o¤ering the top quality
varieties in a given sector also exhibit the strongest degree of export specialisation in that sector.
Finally, note that Proposition 3 also implies that there exists a subset of countries in H exhibiting
a lower RCA in sector z than countries in L. The reason is that wh > 1 creates a wedge between
the absolute and the comparative advantage, allowing countries in L to supply more competitively
the relatively low-quality varieties of good z.
3.2 Import specialisation
We turn now to study the implications of this version of the model in terms of import specialisation.
For any destination country in region j = H;L, the import penetration of good z originating from
16
country v is given by IP jz;v = jz;v =
R
V 
j
z;v dv. Since the budget constraint implies
R
V 
j
z;v dv = 1,
we may then track the behaviour of IP jz;v simply by looking at the demand intensity jz;v.
Proposition 4 Let IP jz; and IP
j
z; denote the import penetration in sector z in region j = H;L
by countries in region H that received best possible productivity draw, z;h = , and the worst
possible productivity draw, z;h = , respectively. Then:
1. IP jz; < IP
j
z;l < IP
j
z;, where IP
j
z;l is the import penetration in sector z in region j = H;L by
countries in region L. Moreover, for imports sourced from region H, the import penetration
in sector z by a country h is decreasing in its sectoral productivity draw: @IP jz;h=@z;h < 0.
2. The di¤erence in import penetration in any given sector z between a country from H that
received the best possible productivity draw and any other producer of good z is always larger
in region H than in region L. Formally:
IPHz;   IPHz;h > IPLz;   IPLz;h; whenever z;h > ;
IPHz;   IPHz;l > IPLz;   IPLz;l:
The rst part of Proposition 4 can be seen simply as the demand-side counterpart of Proposition
3: importers source a larger share of good z from exporters with a cost advantage in sector z (this is,
ultimately, what turns these exporters into the ones exhibiting the greatest RCA in that sector).
More interestingly, the second part of Proposition 4 states that import specialisation in those
exporters is stronger for richer importers (that is, for countries in region H).
The intuition for this result rests on the specic nonhomothetic structure of (3). As shown in
Proposition 2, richer importers buy high-quality varieties, which are exactly those for which the
cost advantage of countries receiving better sectoral productivity draws widens. In addition, since
the preference structure in (3) also implies that high-quality varieties attract growing consumer
expenditure shares, richer importers tend to spend proportionally more in commodities sourced
from exporters that exhibit a stronger cost advantage in higher-quality varieties.
3.3 Discussion: Sectoral trade ows
The previous subsections have dealt separately with the behaviour of exporters facing importers
with heterogeneous income, and with the behaviour of importers facing exporters with hetero-
geneous cost advantages. The joint consideration of these results yields an additional important
prediction. To illustrate this prediction, we focus now on two intertwined demand-supply relation-
ships implicit in our model: i) the link between the sectoral productivity draw z;v and the RCA
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of exporter v in sector z; ii) the link between z;v and the import penetration by exporter v in the
total consumption of good z in a generic destination country i.
Firstly, Proposition 3 implies that, for a given income of the exporter wv, better productivity
draws in sector z lead to a greater RCA in that sector: @RCAz;v=@z;v < 0. Secondly, Proposition
4 adds to this result that (again for a given level of wv) the import penetration in sector z in any
destination country i is larger in the case of exporters that received better productivity draws in
sector z: @IP iz;v=@z;v < 0. Furthermore, that proposition also shows that the association between
IP iz;v and z;v becomes stronger in richer importers: @(@IP
i
z;v=@z;v)=@wi < 0.
The above results can in turn be translated into relations between IP iz;v and RCAz;v. In partic-
ular, when holding xed the income of the exporter wv, the model delivers: @IP iz;v=@RCAz;v > 0
and @(@IP iz;v=@RCAz;v)=@wi > 0. The rst of these predictions is simply stating that import pen-
etrations by exporters with a higher RCA will be larger in all importers. More interestingly, the
second entails that, as we move from poorer to richer importers, the positive association between
import penetration and RCA becomes even stronger.
The economic intuition behind this last result is analogous to the one discussed in Section 2
for the case of growing world incomes with a rising . However, with cross-country inequality
this intuition becomes even more apparent because importers with heterogeneous incomes choose
di¤erent quality levels of all varieties, which in turn implies di¤erent distributions of budget shares
across the same set of exporters. More precisely, since richer consumers purchase higher-quality
varieties of each good z, the most productive suppliers of each good z turn out to be better able
to exploit their widening cost advantage when dealing with richer importers.
Our model thus delivers a mechanism entailing a simultaneous rise in sectoral trade speciali-
sation by importers and exporters at higher incomes: when measured at the sectoral level, richer
importers tend to increasingly specialise their consumption in those varieties of goods supplied
by the exporters who display a stronger revealed comparative advantage in the sector. In the
next section we provide evidence consistent with this prediction using bilateral trade ows at the
sectoral level.
4 Empirical analysis
Our theory rests crucially on two fundamental assumptions: one related to cross-country het-
erogeneities in sectoral production functions; the other one related to nonhomotheticities in the
consumerspreference structure. In terms of technologies, we have assumed that cross-country
sectoral productivity di¤erentials widen at higher levels of quality of production. Concerning pref-
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erences, we postulated a utility function where richer individuals choose a consumption basket
comprising higher-quality varieties of all available goods.
Taken independently, each of these two assumptions lead to clear testable predictions in terms
of trade ows, which in fact our theory shares with several other papers in the trade literature.
First, our model implies that the degree of specialisation of countries in particular goods and the
level of quality of their exports of those goods should display a positive correlation.13 Second,
our model implies that richer consumers buy their imports in higher quality levels than poorer
consumers do.14
Besides these two results, the most interesting testable prediction of our model stems from
the interaction between the above-mentioned assumptions. When consumers taste for quality
rises with their income and sectoral cost advantages deepen at higher levels of quality, richer
countries will purchase a larger share of their imports of every good from economies displaying a
stronger revealed comparative advantage in the sector producing the good. In other words, our
model yields novel predictions regarding import specialisation at di¤erent income levels, which
link richer importers more intensely to highly specialised exporters in each of the sectors.
4.1 Baseline regression structure
Recall from Section 3.3 that, once we condition on the income of the exporter wv, our model
delivers the following two results:
13Several papers provide evidence consistent with this prediction. For example, Alcala (2012) shows that import
prices by the US in the apparel industry tend to be higher for imports sourced from exporter displaying a higher
revealed comparative advantage in that industry. In a previous working paper version, Jaimovich and Merella
(2013), we show that a similar correlation is found considering all 5000 products categorised according to the 6-digit
Harmonised System (HS-6), and all pairs of bilateral sectoral trade ows in the world. Furthermore, empirical
results consistent with this assumption can also be found in articles using rm-level data. For example, Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012) nd a positive correlation between output prices in narrowly dened products and plant size for
Colombian manufacturing rms, while Manova and Zhang (2012) report a positive correlation between unit values
and total export sales by Chinese rms. Similarly, Crino and Epifani (2012) nd that Italian manufacturing rms
exhibiting higher TFP tend to concentrate their production in high-quality varieties and export relatively more to
richer destinations.
14There is also vast evidence supporting this prediction: e.g., Hallak (2006, 2010), Choi et al. (2009), Fieler
(2012), Feenstra and Romalis (2012), Crozet et al. (2012), Chen and Juvenal (2014), Flach (2014). In particular,
Fieler (2012) shows that import prices correlate positively with the level of income per head of the importer, even
when looking at products originating from the same exporter and HS-6 category. The use of unit values as proxy
for quality dates back to Schott (2004). See Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011) for some innovative
methods to infer quality from prices, taking into account both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation of products.
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(i) The import penetration in sector z of country i is larger for exporters that exhibit a higher
RCA in z.
(ii) If we compare importers with di¤erent incomes, the import penetration in sector z by exporters
that exhibit a higher RCA in z is relatively larger in richer importers.
Result (i) is simply saying that all importers tend to buy more of good z from exporters
displaying a revealed comparative advantage in sector z. In that regard, result (i) is not really
informative about the interplay between our nonhomothetic preferences and the cost advantage of
exporters more specialised in a good z intensifying at the high-quality versions of that good. Result
(ii), instead, is the direct consequence of that particular mechanism. More precisely, this result
is suggestive of a positive correlation between import penetration and the exporters revealed
comparative advantage of varying magnitude depending on the level of GDP per capita of the
importer. This feature could be captured by a regression that allows for heterogeneous intensity
of import penetration at di¤erent levels of importer income, such as one including an interaction
term between exporters RCA and importers income per head like:
log
 
IP iz;v

=  log (RCAz;v) +  [log (RCAz;v) log(wi)] + ' log(wi) +  log(wv) + uiz;v: (13)
A regression of this type should yield an estimated value of  > 0 to be consistent with our
model. The theoretical rationale for this prediction lies in the interaction between richer consumers
buying higher quality versions of the traded goods, and exporters with a stronger RCA in a sector
being increasingly productive at delivering high quality versions of these goods. Notice that (13)
includes the exporters per-capita GDP, wv, as additional regressor. This is done in order to
account for the fact that prices at which exporters sell their output may di¤er simply owing to
di¤erences in local wages more precisely, in terms of our model results, once we condition on wv,
we are able to maintain the monotonicity between RCAz;v and z;v that we exploit in results (i)
and (ii) above.
In terms of actual implementation, our regression needs to include a number of additional
controls. In particular, we consider:
 Importer xed e¤ects. In our main regression, given by (14) below, we substitute the
importers per-capita GDP (wi) by a set of importers xed e¤ects. Since we are using a cross
section of countries, these su¢ ce to control for importer income. In addition, our model
assumes identical trade openness and barriers across all importers, which in practice does
not seem a tenable assumption. Including importer xed e¤ects partly controls for some of
these factors as well.
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 Exporter xed e¤ects. Similarly, we substitute exporters per-capita GDP (wv) by a set
of exporters xed e¤ects. Like with importer xed e¤ects, the exporter xed e¤ects control
for additional e¤ects, possibly present in practice, that are assumed away by our model (e.g.,
di¤erences in openness across exporters).
 Product xed e¤ects. Our model assumes symmetry of technologies for all sectors, while
it also assumes no di¤erential trade costs or barriers across sectors. In practice, these as-
sumptions do not seem tenable either. In our main regression (14) we thus include product
xed e¤ects to control for some of these factors.15
 Gravity terms. Our model assumes away any sort of trade costs or frictions that are
partner-specic, hence (13) applies identically to any importer-exporter transaction. In
practice, not only there are trade costs and frictions, but also they a¤ect di¤erent part-
ners di¤erently. In our main regression (14) we include the standard gravity terms to control
for some of these factors.
In Table 1.A, we therefore show the results of regression (14) using sectoral bilateral trade data
for year 2009, where we include product dummies (z), importer dummies (i), exporter dummies
("v), and a set of bilateral gravity terms (Gi;v) taken from Mayer and Zignago (2006):16
log
 
IP iz;v

=  log (RCAz;v) +  [log (wi) log (RCAz;v)]
+Gi;v + z + i + "v + z;v;i:
(14)
Before moving on to the estimation results, we should conclude this subsection by stressing that
our regression analysis aims is capturing only a partial correlation coe¢ cient, possibly becoming
stronger at higher levels of importer income per head. The coe¢ cient  > 0 is indeed indicative of
15 In some specications, we substitute the importer xed e¤ects and product xed e¤ects by importer-product
xed e¤ects. These can account for di¤erences in sectoral market structures and sectoral trade barriers across
importers. In addition, they may also account for heterogeneity in importers preferences for di¤erent goods, which
is assumed away by our common utility function.
16 Import penetration, as dened by (9), and revealed comparative advantage, as dened by (10), are both computed
using the dataset compiled by Gaulier and Zignago (2010). This database reports monetary values of bilateral trade
(measured FOB in US dollars) for years 1995 to 2009 for more than 5000 products categorised according to the
6-digit Harmonised System (HS-6). As robustness checks, we have also run the regressions reported in Table 1.A
separately for all the years in the sample. All their estimates results are of very similar in magnitude to those of
year 2009, and available upon request. Notice, also, that the fact that we are looking at a cross-section of countries
implicitly works as holding xed  in the model. If we were using instead a panel of countries, we could remove the
e¤ect of a time-varying  simply by including time xed e¤ects in the regression.
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such varying partial correlation. We rely on our model to interpret this result as emerging from the
interplay between nonhomotheticities in quality and widening productivity di¤erentials at higher
levels of the quality ladder. However, as a simple set of correlations, the coe¢ cients in (14) cannot
be directly linked to fundamental parameters of the model. Also for this reason, we cannot make
use of those estimates to back out the values of those parameters and thus construct quantitative
counterfactuals with them.
4.2 Baseline regression results
Before strictly running regression (14), we rstly regress the dependent variable against only the
RCA of exporter v in good z (together with product, importer and exporter dummies). Column (1)
of Table 1.A shows (quite expectably) that those two variables are positively correlated. Secondly,
in column (2), we report the results of the regression that includes the interaction term. We can
see that the estimated  is positive and highly signicant, consistent with our theory. Finally,
in column (3), we add the six traditional gravity terms, and we can observe the previous results
remain essentially intact. We can also observe that the estimates for each of the gravity terms are
signicant, and they all carry the expected sign.
Notice that regression (14) includes exporter xed e¤ects ("v). This implies that our regres-
sions are actually comparing di¤erent degrees of export specialisation across products for a given
exporter, and the di¤erent degrees of import penetration of the exporter across its exports desti-
nations. As such, exporter dummies would control for the fact that a country with higher total
factor productivity may be commanding larger market shares and may be specialising in higher
quality varieties of goods, which are exactly the varieties mostly purchased by richer importers.
4.3 Robustness checks and Linder term
Table 1.B presents some additional regressions as robustness checks. First, in column (1) we show
the results of a regression analogous to column (3) in Table 1.A, but where we control for product-
importer xed e¤ects, instead of product (z) and importer (i) xed e¤ects separately. After
including the set of product-importer dummies, the estimated coe¢ cient for the interaction term
remains essentially intact, as well as its signicance level. Next, in columns (2) and (3) we exclude
from the importers sample the OECD countries and the high-income countries as classied by the
World Bank, respectively. The idea behind these restricted-sample regressions is to see whether
our previous results are driven only by the behaviour of the richest importers. As we can observe,
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Table 1.A
(1) (2) (3)
Log RCA exporter 0.456*** -0.676*** -0.469***
(0.026) (0.138) (0.106)
Interaction term 0.119*** 0.104***
(0.015) (0.012)
Distance expo-impo (× 1000) -0.121***
(0.009)
Contiguity 1.098***
(0.101)
Common official language 0.362***
(0.099)
Common coloniser 0.255*
(0.152)
Common legal origin 0.204***
(0.082)
Common currency 0.351**
(0.149)
Observations 5,773,873 5,773,873 5,571,567
Number of importers 184 184 184
Adj R squared 0.47 0.47 0.53
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer and exporter level reported in parentheses. All data corresponds to the year 2009.
All regressions include product dummies, importer dummies and exporter dummies. The total number of HS 6-digit  products is 5017.
 * significant 10%; ** significant 5%; *** significant 1%.
Dep. Variable: log impo shares of product z  sourced from exporter v
in both cases our correlation of interest remains still positive and highly signicant.17
Our paper emphasises the interplay between nonhomothetic preferences with respect to quality
and increasing sectoral specialisation at higher qualities of production (owing to wider cross-country
sectoral productivity di¤erentials at higher layers of quality). The interaction term in (14) intends
to reect the impact of such mechanism on the intensity of bilateral trade links at di¤erent levels of
income per head of the importer. Some recent articles in the trade literature with nonhomothetic
preferences have argued that richer countries exhibit a comparative advantage in higher-quality
varieties of goods see Hallak (2010) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011).18 If that is actually the case in
reality and, moreover, if the share of imports to GDP grows with the importers income per capita
(as it has been widely documented in the trade literature), then our interaction term in (14) may
end up capturing (at least partially) a di¤erent type of e¤ect: the fact that richer importers, who
tend to source a larger fraction of their nal demand from abroad, establish stronger trade links
17The estimate associated to common currencyfalls essentially to zero in columns (2) and (3). This is because
when we remove the Euro-area countries from the sample, we lose practically all its source of variation.
18 In fact, this result is also present in our model when we extend our basic setup in Section 3 to allow for
cross-country income inequality.
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with richer countries, since these tend to specialise in higher-quality varieties which are in turn those
demanded by richer importers. In order to deal with this concern, the regression in column (4) adds
a Linder term among the regressors. In particular, we include as independent variable the absolute
di¤erence between the log income per head of the importer and exporter: jln yimpo   ln yexpo j.19
This regressor should absorb the above-mentioned concern. The results in column (4) indeed show
that the Linder term carries a negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient, which is consistent with
the evidence of the Linder hypothesis holding at the sectoral level previously found in Hallak (2010).
Nevertheless, the estimate of the coe¢ cient associated to the interaction term remains positive and
highly signicant. This last result suggests that our mechanism explaining the intensity of sectoral
trade links by export source at di¤erent levels of income of importers is playing a role alongside
the traditional Linder-type e¤ect.20
In our theory, both the measures of import penetration and revealed comparative advantage are
endogenous variables, determined simultaneously as general equilibrium outcomes of the model.
For this reason, we cannot interpret those estimates for RCA and the interaction term in Table
1.A and Table 1.B as quantifying a causal e¤ect on the intensity of sectoral import penetration
at di¤erent levels of importer income per head. However, it still proves interesting to use the
estimates in column (4) of Table 1.B to get a feeling of the magnitudes of the correlations arising
from the mechanism proposed by our model relative to those captured by the Linder term.
Our mechanism entails a greater intensity of sectoral bilateral trade between richer importers
and exporters displaying a stronger RCA in the sector. For that reason, in what follows, we
quantify the di¤erence in the correlation between these two variables for a rich importer and a
poor importer, at the level of the logarithm of the RCA corresponding to its 90th percentile (this
value equals 1:07).21 Computing the di¤erence in magnitude yielded by the interaction term for the
19When we use (ln yimpo   ln yexpo )2 instead, the results remain qualitatively the same as in column (4).
20 In practical terms, one additional concern may be raised: the possibility that high-quality varieties of goods
face lower trade frictions than lower-quality ones. If this were true, then our interaction term in (14) might also
be capturing a di¤erent type of e¤ect: the fact that richer economies tend to consume higher-quality varieties, and
that those varieties are traded more intensely as a result of lower frictions. Since we cannot observe unit trade costs
at di¤erent layers of quality, and our regressions exploit within-product variation of import shares by source, we
cannot envisage a practical way to directly gauge the severity of this concern. Notice, however, that if this issue were
quantitatively signicant, we should expect to nd very di¤erent estimate for distanceand contiguityin column
(1) and column (3), since the latter excludes richer importers. Indeed, the fact that both regressions yield similar
estimates suggests that, once we control for all the importer and exporter characteristics, we do not observe huge
di¤erences in the e¤ects of sector-specic trade frictions across richer and poorer importers.
21The median number of exporters by product in our sample is 80, therefore the 90th percentile value of the RCA
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importer in the 90th percentile of the GDP per head in PPP (which corresponds to Belgium with
34; 625) and that one for 10th percentile (which corresponds to Mali with 999), we obtain that the
90th-percentile exporter in a given sector (measured by the RCA) exhibits an income penetration
that is approximately 32.6% larger in the high-income importer relative to the low-income importer.
Similarly, using the estimate for the Linder term ( 0:117) with the absolute di¤erence between
the logarithm of Belgiums and Malis GDP per head in PPP, we obtain that economies in the
top 90th and bottom 10th percentile of income tend to exhibit import penetrations approximately
41.5% lower than those displayed by equally rich countries. These simple computations suggest
that both our proposed mechanism and the standard Linder e¤ect seem to be driving important
quantitative e¤ects in terms of the correlations between sectoral bilateral trade links and income
per head observed in the data.
4.4 Sectoral and product level regressions
The regressions in Table 1.A pool together approximately 5000 di¤erent 6-digit products, implicitly
assuming the same coe¢ cients for all of them. This might actually be a strong assumption to make.
In Table 2.A we split the set of HS 6-digit products according to fourteen separate subgroups at
seems a sensible benchmark to look at for a highly specialised exporterof the product.
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Table 2.A
animal & vegetable mineral chem. & plastic & skin, leath.
anim. prod. products products allied ind. rubbers & furs
log RCA -0.322*** -0.298*** -0.344*** -0.269** -0.500*** -0.548*** -0.622***
(0.106) (0.104) (0.096) (0.145) (0.138) (0.138) (0.155)
interaction term 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.120***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 105,332 210,866 215,975 72,839 602,592 317,328 66,347
Adj. R squared 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.60
wood & stone & machinery
wood prod. glass & electrical
log RCA -0.444*** -0.411*** -0.644*** -0.527*** -0.541*** -0.711*** -0.554***
(0.105) (0.166) (0.155) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) (0.112)
interaction term 0.101*** 0.090*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.111*** 0.134*** 0.114***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 252,135 795,926 75,522 209,397 630,910 1,296,090 176,916
Adj. R squared 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.53
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at  the importer-exporter level in parentheses. All data corresponds to year 2009.
All regression include product, exporter and importer dummies, and the set of gravity terms used before in T able 1.A taken
from Mayer & Zignano (2006). *** significant 1%.
transport.textiles footwear
foodstuff
metals
Table 2.B
median
insignificant significant 10% significant 1% insignificant significant 10% significant 1% coefficient
Total number of different products was 4904 (98 products were lost due to insufficient observations).  Data corresponds to year 2009
Regressions include importer dummies and the set of gravity terms used in Table 1.A taken from Mayer & Zignano (2006).
Independent regressions for each HS 6-digit product
0.076
1.6%
% positive coefficients % negative coefficients
83.5% 16.4%
29.8% 15.7% 38.0% 14.3% 0.5%
the 2-digit level.22 In the sake of brevity, we report only the estimates for  and  in (14). As we
can observe, the estimates for each subgroup follow a similar pattern as those in Table 1.A: the
estimate for the interaction term is always positive and highly signicant for each subgroup.
Lastly, as further robustness check, in Table 2.B we report the percentage of positive and
negative estimates obtained for  when we run a separate regression for each of the products in the
HS 6-digit categorisation. These results again tend to conrm those obtained before Table 1.A.
22The subgroups are formed by merging together subgroups at 2-digit aggregation level, according to
http://www.foreign-trade.com/reference/hscode.htm. We excluded the subgroups Miscellaneousand Service.
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4.5 A comparison with the empirical predictions in the existing literature
Three recent related articles have also incorporated nonhomothetic preferences into general equi-
librium trade models, and study the ensuing patterns of trade ows: Fieler (2011), Fajgelbaum,
Grossman and Helpman (2011) FGH, and Jaimovich and Merella (2012). In the Introduction,
we summarised mostly the main theoretical di¤erences between our framework and theirs. We now
discuss briey how some of our empirical predictions di¤er from theirs, and how these di¤erences
may be discerned in the data.
Fieler (2011) focuses on the bilateral trade ows of horizontally di¤erentiated goods displaying
heterogeneous income demand elasticities.23 She nds that including intersectoral nonhomothetic-
ities into a model à la Eaton and Kortum (2002), coupled with productivity dispersions across
countries that correlate positively with income demand elasticities, can substantially improve its
quantitative predictions on aggregate trade ows. Her empirical predictions then encompass cross-
country variation of aggregate trade ows at di¤erent income levels as a result of intersectoral
changes in trade, while her paper is silent about intrasectoral variations in trade ows. This last
source of adjustment is exactly what regression (14) aims at. More precisely, our regressions are
exploiting within-product variation of export sources by importer, abstracting from intersectoral
changes in trade ows. The main novel empirical nding is that, looking at each particular product
category in isolation, we can observe that richer importers source a larger share of their imports
from those exporters that display a stronger degree of specialisation in the sector producing that
product.
FGH shares with our framework the introduction of nonhomothetic preferences in a context
with vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation. Both papers lead to a rise in international specialisation
as incomes increase. The underlying driving forces however di¤er. In FGH, the main driving force
is the exploitation of a home-market e¤ect, in the spirit of Linder (1961).24 In our paper, instead,
the leading aspect is the deepening of heterogeneities in the cost of production across countries
at higher levels of quality. More importantly, our mechanism leads to some testable predictions
that cannot be straightforwardly rationalised by FGH. In particular, FGH leads to patterns of
productive specialisation that take place only along the quality dimension: richer countries are net
23See also Hunter (1991) and Francois and Kaplan (1996) for partial equilibrium frameworks assessing the relevance
of intersectoral di¤erences in income demand elasticities in explaining trade patterns.
24Hallak (2010) provides a partial equilibrium model with a home-market e¤ect that also builds on the original
hypothesis in Linder (1961). In his model, countries of similar incomes trade more with each other, when considering
sectoral level trade ows. He also provides empirical evidence for this prediction.
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exporters of high-quality varieties, while poorer countries are net exporter of low-quality ones. Yet,
those patterns of specialisation in quality cannot be ascribed to any specic sector. By contrast, in
our model, for each particular sector, richer importers will end up establishing stronger trade links
with those exporters more intensely specialised in the sector. From a strict empirical viewpoint,
the mechanism suggested by FGH is then reected in the Linder term included in column (4) of
Table 2.A. However, even when we take into account that richer importers trade more with richer
exporters, this factor does not fully explain the fact that richer economies source a larger fraction of
their imports of each product from exporters exhibiting a comparative advantage in those products.
In that regard, our mechanism seems to play an important role in the determination of sectoral
trade links, alongside the more traditional Linder home-market e¤ect.
Nonhomotheticities along both the vertical and horizontal dimensions is also a feature present
in Jaimovich and Merella (2012). The main distinction between that model and the one presented
here lies in the technological structure. Jaimovich and Merella (2012) remained within a traditional
Ricardian framework where comparative advantages apply only at the sectoral level. There, richer
economies specialise in goods with longer quality ladders and poorer ones in those with shorter
ladders. The model presented here, instead, exploits an intrasectoral comparative advantage, as
the result of widening productivity di¤erences at higher layers of quality. This, in turn, delivers
predictions for the degree of specialisation within the same product category, which cannot be
rationalised by a model featuring full sectoral specialisation by a single country, like in Jaimovich
and Merella (2012). In particular, that model is unable to account for some of the novel empirical
ndings that we delineate here: i.e., the intensity of sectoral specialization by exporters at di¤erent
levels of quality of production, and the varying intensity of import penetration at di¤erent levels
of importersincome.
5 Further Discussion
The next subsections develop two simple extensions to our model in Section 3, in order to study
the impact of di¤erent policies aimed at promoting the production and size of a particular sector
in the economy. We rst study the case of import tari¤s, then the case of a subsidy to local
producers. In the sake of brevity, we relegate the formal analysis of both subsections to the Online
Appendix, in Section A.3 and Section A.4 respectively.
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5.1 Trade frictions and consumer loss
Although the main focus of the paper is on the behaviour of sectoral import shares, our model
carries also implications regarding trade frictions and consumer welfare. In particular, in our
framework, import restrictions entail a more severe welfare loss for richer countries than for poorer
ones. Intuitively, our nonhomothetic structure implies that richer importers choose higher-quality
bundles of goods and devote a larger share of income to goods sourced from exporters who can
more e¢ ciently increase quality of production. Therefore, since comparative advantages deepen
and gains from trade expand at higher levels of quality, it is rich consumers those who benet most
from frictionless trade.
To illustrate the argument succinctly, it proves more convenient to consider a simplied version
of our model with only two levels of sectoral productivity draws z;v 2 f; g and a discrete
number of countries. In particular, we let region L and region H comprise now two countries each:
L = fl1; l2g and H = fh1; h2g. Like before, countries in L always receive the bad sectoral draw 
in all sectors. Instead, for region H, we assume that in each sector z one country receives z;v = 
and the other one z;v = . To keep the symmetry we had in Section 3, suppose that h1 and h2
have both an equal mass of sectors with good and bad sectoral productivity draws.25
Consider rst a country from region L. This country (by assumption) receives the bad pro-
ductivity draw, , in sector z. Suppose that, for some reason, this country wishes to discourage
imports of good z, and thus imposes a tari¤ on those goods.26 Since countries in region L are
poorer, the welfare loss to local consumers owing to the tari¤ will not be too large. The reason
for this is that individuals in region L tend to purchase lower-quality varieties of z, and for these
varieties the productivity gap relative to the most e¢ cient producer in sector z remains relatively
narrow. Consider now the country in region H that received the bad productivity draw in sector z.
In this case, the welfare loss to local consumer resulting from a tari¤ on imports of good z becomes
more severe. Since richer consumers are those who intend to purchase higher-quality versions of
good z, they end up being harmed relatively more by tari¤s imposed on sectors where there are
other countries that can more easily upgrade quality. In that respect, our model suggests that
gains from trade are especially stronger for richer consumers and, therefore, high-income countries
should display a more negative stance towards trade barriers to imports.
25That is, for each sector z, there is always only one country in H with draw  (and only one with draw ), while
the mass of sectors that received a draw  is equal to 0:5 both in h1 and in h2.
26This could be the result, for example, of policymakers of country i believing sector z represents an important
sector where to develop enough local production, hence it needs protection from more e¢ cient foreign producers.
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In order to o¤er a hint of the relative magnitude of welfare loss between richer and poorer
importers, in the Online Appendix A.3 we exploit a pooled estimation of the log of unit values (used
as a proxy for quality) on the log of importers income to back out two gures. First, we pinpoint
several implied values of the sectoral productivity draws. Then we derive the respective welfare
loss di¤erential, due to import tari¤, that each of those draws would generate when comparing
individuals from a rst country with those from a second country being 10% richer than the rst.
The fact that the consumer welfare loss owing to the tari¤ is greater in richer economies rests
crucially on our specic non-homothetic structure of preferences. In particular, under homothetic
preferences, willingness to pay for higher quality will not rise with income. In such a case, all
consumers, regardless of their income, will su¤er a welfare loss of equal magnitude after the im-
position of an import tari¤. In Section A.5 of the Online Appendix we show formally how the
unequal welfare e¤ects of an import tari¤ vanish away in the presence of homothetic preferences.
5.2 Sectoral subsidy and comparative advantage
The previous subsection has illustrated the di¤erential welfare e¤ects of a sector-specic import
tari¤ across richer and poorer importers. One could rationalise this tari¤ as the outcome of a policy
that aims at promoting some particular sector of the economy. An alternative (and, possibly, more
direct) policy to foster sector z is simply to subsidize the local producers in that sector.
Consider again the simplied model introduced in the previous subsection, and suppose that
a country with a bad productivity draw in sector z (i.e., a country v with z;v = ) introduces
a subsidy for local producers of good z, with the intention of expanding the size of this sector.
In our model, such a subsidy turns out to be more e¤ective in increasing the share of sector z
in the GDP in poorer economies than in richer ones. The reason for this is again related to our
nonhomothetic preference structure. In our model, in order to absorb a larger share of demand
in sector z, a country must be able to o¤er higher-quality varieties of good z more cheaply than
their competitors. When we compare a country from region L with the country from region H
that received the bad draw in sector z, it turns out that the impact of the subsidy in fostering
sector z is stronger in the former. The intuition for this result is that, given our non-homothetic
structure of preferences, higher qualities are instrumental to attracting larger consumer spending
shares. Therefore, the expansionary e¤ect of the subsidy turns out to be larger in L than in a
country from region H with the same draw of z;v = , as in the former the e¤ect of the subsidy
on quality expansion is compounded with the lower labour cost in L.27
27 In Section A.5 of the Online Appendix we show formally how this result disappears when we substitute our
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6 Conclusion
We presented a Ricardian model of trade with the distinctive feature that comparative advantages
reveal themselves gradually over the course of development. The key factors behind this process
are the individuals upgrading in quality of consumption combined with sectoral productivity
di¤erentials that widen up at higher levels of quality. As incomes grow and wealthier consumers
raise the quality of their consumption baskets, cost di¤erentials between countries become more
pronounced. The emergence of such heterogeneities, in turn, alters sectoral trade ows, as each
economy gradually further specialises in producing the subset of goods for which they enjoy a
rising comparative advantage.
Our theory yielded a number of implications that nd empirical support. Using bilateral trade
data at the product level, we showed that the share of imports originating from exporters more
intensely specialised in a given product correlates positively with GDP per head of the importer.
This is consistent with richer consumers buying a larger share of their consumption of specic
goods from countries exhibiting a comparative advantage in the sectors producing those goods.
Our core model assumed away any sort of trade frictions. This was in a sense a deliberate choice,
so as to illustrate our proposed mechanism as cleanly as possible. In this respect, we extended
our analysis in two directions, discussing some interesting policy implications of our theory in
the presence of frictions. First, gains from free trade are stronger for more developed economies.
Second, sectoral subsidies to local producers are more e¤ective in stimulating their production and
exports when introduced in developing countries. These ndings seem to t well with some recent
claims suggesting that policy interventions may help developing countries in becoming stronger
competitors in sectors where they previously enjoyed no comparative advantage.
non-homothetic preferences by homothetic preferences.
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Appendices
A Omitted proofs
Formal Solution of the Consumer Optimisation Problem. By using the expression (5)
for physical consumption and the price functions (2), the consumer optimisation problem can be
re-stated as one where the consumer must choose the optimal quality qz;v and optimal budget
allocation z;v for each commodity (z; v) 2 Z V. In particular, using the index i 2 V to denote
country of origin of the consumer, the optimisation problem can be thus re-stated as follows:
max
fqiz;v ;iz;vg(z;v)2ZV
U =
(Z
Z
"Z
V
qiz;v ln
 
1 + 
A
iz;v 
qiz;v
z;v wiwv
!
dv
#
dz
) 1

subject to:
Z
Z
Z
V
iz;v dv dz  1; and qiz;v  1:
(15)
Denoting by i the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, and by iz;v the
Lagrange multipliers associated to each constraint qiz;v  1, we may derive the rst-order conditions:
lniz;v   z;v ln qiz;v + ln (1 + )  lnA+ ln

wi
wv

  z;v + iz;v = 0; (16)
1

  z
qiz;v
iz;v
  i = 0; (17)
qiz;v   1  0; iz;v  0; and
 
qiz;v   1

iz;v = 0; (18)
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Z
Z
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iz;v dv dz  0; i  0; and
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Z
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iz;v dv dz

i = 0: (19)
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:
Note that, although z in (17) are indexed by z, in the optimum all z will turn out to be equal.28
Hence, we may write that, in the optimum, z =  for all z, and dene:
i  (
  ) i;
28The result z =  for all z stems from the assumed iid draws of z;v with a continuum of countries and goods.
The combination of these assumptions implies that all goods z will display (ex post) an identical distribution of
z;v over the space of countries v. Such ex post symmetry in the distribution of z;v across goods, in turn, leads
consumers to optimally set z =  for all z.
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which in turn allows us to re-write (17) as qiz;v = 
iiz;v. Hence, integrating both sides of the
equation over V and Z, and noting that in the optimum the rst expression in (19) always hold
with equality, we may obtain: Z
Z
Z
V
qiz;v dv dz = 
i; (20)
which in turn implies that:
iz;v =
qiz;v
i
: (21)
Finally, note that (20) can be interpreted as the average quality of the optimal consumption basket.
Denoting this by Qi  i, from (21) it straightforwardly follows that iz;v = qiz;v=Qi.
Proof of Lemma 1. We rst show that when wv = w for all v, none of the constraints qz;v  1
of (15) binds in the optimum. For this, note that given the expressions in (16) and (21), whenever
wv = w for all v, it must be the case that qiz0;v0  qiz00;v00 , z0;v0  z00;v00 . Thus, if in the optimum
qiz00;v00 > 1 holds for a pair (z
00; v00) with z00;v00 = , then qiz;v > 1 must be true for all pairs (z; v).
Then, in order to prove that qiz;v > 1 holds for all (z; v), it su¢ ces to prove the following: even
when all z;v = , except for one single good-variety (z
00; v00) for which z00;v00 = , the problem
(15) yields qiz00;v00 > 1. If this is the case, then q
i
z00;v00 > 1 will actually hold true for any distribution
of the productivity draws z;v with support in the interval

; 

, which includes the uniform
distribution as one special case.
When all z;v = , except for a single (zero-mass) (z
00; v00) with z00;v00 = , it follows that when
qz00;v00 = 1:
qiz;v = e
  
 1

1 + 
Ai
 1
 1
; for all (z; v) 2 Z V other than  z00; v00 : (22)
Integrating (22) across the space Z and V, we obtain i = e =( 1)

(1 + ) =
 
Ai
1=( 1), which
in turn yields:
i =
1
e

1 + 
A
 1

: (23)
Now, plugging (23) into (16) and (21), computed for (z00; v00), while using the fact that iz00;v00 = 1=i
when qiz00;v00 = 1:
ln (1 + )  lnA  [ln (1 + )  lnA] = + ln e   + iz00;v00 = 0: (24)
Hence, considering the denition of A  e ( 1)=( 1), (24) reduces to
ln (1 + ) + iz00;v00

   1 = 0: (25)
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However, (25) cannot be true for any  > 0: As a consequence, it must be true that qz00;v00 > 1 for
all  > 0, implying in turn that qz;v > 1 must hold under any distribution of z;v with support
within the interval

; 

when wv = w for all v. Now, taking into account the above result, we
can use (20), (21) and (16), setting iz;v = 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V, to obtain (6) and (7).
Proof of Lemma 2. When wv = w for all v 2 V, since iz;v = 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V, using (21)
into (16) leads to ln (1 + )  lnA  lni = z;v +
 
z;v   1

ln qiz;v for all (z; v) 2 ZV. Dening
now i()  ln (1 + )  lnA  lni, we can observe that:
@i
@
=
 
z;v   1

qiz;v
@qiz;v
@
: (26)
But, given that
 
z;v   1

> 0, then all @qiz;v=@ must necessarily carry the same sign. Suppose
then that @qiz;v=@  0, for all (z; v) 2 Z  V. Recalling (20), it follows that @i=@  0 as well.
But, since @i=@ = (1 + ) 1  i 1 @i=@, the fact that @i=@  0 implies that @i=@ > 0,
which in turn contradicts the fact that @qiz;v=@  0 for all (z; v) 2 ZV. As a result, it must be
the case that @qiz;v=@ > 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V. Finally, the result @2qiz;v=
 
@ @z;v

< 0 follows
immediately from the expression in (26), after noting that @
 
@i=@

=@z;v = 0:
Proof of Lemma 3. Notice rst that M iz;v  iz;v and M iz 
R
V 
i
z;v dv. Also, when all countries
in the world have the same wage (and, therefore, the same income), in the optimum iz;v = z;v
for all importers. Moreover, the symmetry in the distribution of draws z;v, also implies that, in
the optimum, M iz = 1. Therefore, using (9), IP
i
z;v = z;v.
To compute the RCA, note that Xz;v 
R
V 
i
z;v di, Xv 
R
Z
R
V 
i
z;v di dz, Wz 
R
VXz;v dv and
W  RZWz dz. Then, using the fact that iz;v = z;v for all importers, then Xz;v = R 10 z;v di =
z;v. Moreover, the budget constraint in turn implies thatXv 
R 1
0 z;v dz = 1. Also, the symmetry
in the distribution of draws z;v implies that the aggregate world spending in good z will be equal
for all goods, thus Wz =
R
V z;v dv = 1. Plugging in all these results into (10), and using the fact
that W = 1, the claimed RCAz;v = z;v result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. Preliminarily, notice that (20) together with (21) yields:
z0;v0 =
qz0;v0R
Z
R
V qz;v dv dz
: (27)
From (16), together with Lemma 1 and Proposition 5, we have:
 
z;v   1

ln qz;v + z;v = ln (1 + )  lnA  ln; (28)
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thus, computing (28) for any pair of commodities (z0; v0) and (z; v) yields:
 
z0;v0   1

ln qz0;v0 + z0;v0 =
 
z;v   1

ln qz;v + z;v: (29)
Hence, (29) implies that qz0;v0 > qz;v () z0;v0 < z;v. By considering this result in conjunction
with (27), our claim immediately follows.
Furthermore, di¤erentiating (29) with respect to  yields:
dqz0;v0
d
=
z;v   1
z0;v0   1
qz0;v0
qz;v
dqz;v
d
: (30)
Using (20), (28) and (30):
dqz0;v0
d
=
A
1 + 

z0;v0   1
qz0;v0
  1

Z
Z
Z
V
z0;v0   1
z;v   1
qz;v
qz0;v0
dv dz
 1
> 0 (31)
Moreover, from (27), and considering (30) and (31):
dz0;v0
d
=
1
2
dqz0;v0
d
Z
Z
Z
V

z;v   z0;v0
z;v   1

qz;v dv dz

(32)
It is then easy to observe that (30) implies that dqz0;v0=d > dqz;v=d when z0;v0 < z;v. By
considering this result in conjunction with (32) our claim immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part (i). From the FOC (16)-(19) we may obtain that for a consumer in any country in
region L the following conditions must hold:
  (   1) ln qLL   lnL + ln (1 + )  lnA   + LL = 0; for all (z; l) 2 Z L; (33)
   z;h   1 ln qLz;h  lnL+ ln (1 + )  lnA  lnwh z;h+ Lz;h = 0; for all (z; h) 2 ZH: (34)
Similarly, for a consumer in any country in region H, it must be true that:
  (   1) ln qHL   lnH + ln (1 + )  lnA+ lnwh    + HL = 0; for all (z; l) 2 Z L; (35)
   z;h   1 ln qHz;h   lnH + ln (1 + )  lnA  z;h + Hz;h = 0; for all (z; h) 2 ZH: (36)
Suppose now there exists some (z0; v0) 2 Z  V for which qLz0;v0 > qHz0;v0 . Then, combining either
the pair of equations (33) and (35), or the pair of equations (34) and (36), in both cases we would
obtain that:
ln

H
Lwh

=
 
z0;v0   1

ln
 
qLz0;v0
qHz0;v0
!
+ Hz0;v0 > 0: (37)
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Expression (37) implies, in turn, that 1 < L < whL < H : From (20), it follows that there must
exist some (z00; v00) 2 Z  V for which qLz00;v00 < qHz00;v00 . Using the same line of reasoning, we now
obtain:
ln
 
Lwh=
H

=
 
z00;v00   1

ln
 
qHz00;v00=q
L
z00;v00

+ Lz00;v00 > 0;
which contradicts (37). As a consequence, it must be the case that qHz;v  qLz;v for all (z; v) 2 ZV.
Now, suppose qHz0;v0 = q
L
z0;v0 > 1 for some (z
0; v0) 2 Z  V. Again, combining either the pair of
equations (33) and (35), or the pair of equations (34) and (36), we obtain:
ln
 
H=Lwh

= 0: (38)
Expression (38) implies, in turn, that 1 < L < whL = H : Hence, there must exist again some
(z00; v00) 2 Z V for which qLz00;v00 < qHz00;v00 . Using the same line of reasoning, we now obtain:
ln
 
Lwh=
H

=
 
z00;v00   1

ln
 
qHz00;v00=q
L
z00;v00

> 0;
which contradicts (38). Therefore, it must be true that qHz;v > q
L
z;v for all (z; v) 2 ZV, whenever
qHz;v > 1:
Part (ii). The proof that qiz;l = q
i
L for all (z; l) 2 Z L follows straightforwardly from (33) and
(35). For the second argument, let i = L, and consider the commodity (z0; h0) 2 ZH such that
qLz0;h0 = q
L
L > 1. Using (33) and (34) we obtain, respectively:
  (   1) ln qLL   lnL + ln (1 + )  lnA   = 0;
and:
   z0;h0   1 ln qLL   lnL + ln (1 + )  lnA  lnwh   z0;h0 = 0:
This, in turn, leads to:
(   1) ln qLL +  =
 
z0;h0   1

ln qLL + lnwh + z0;h0 : (39)
Isolating now z0;h0 from (39) we then have z0;h0 =    lnwh=
 
1 + ln qLL
  b < . Suppose
now that b  . Since @qLz;h=@z;h  0, from the denition of b it follows that qLz;h  qLL for all
(z; h) 2 Z  H. Next, from the denition of L, we obtain that L  qLL. In addition, from the
market clearing condition for a country in L, we have qHL wh=
H + (1  ) qLL=L = 1, where 
is the measure of countries in region H. This leads to 1   qHL wh=H = (1  ) qLL=L > 1   ,
which in turn implies that qHL wh=
H < 1. Now, using the fact that whL > H and the result
L  qLL, the last inequality nally yields qHL < L  qLL, leading to a contradiction. Hence, it must
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necessarily be that b > . Thus, given the fact that @qLz;h=@z;h < 0 whenever qLz;h > 1, the result
qLz; < q
L
L < q
L
z; immediately follows. An analogous reasoning, letting i = H, may be followed to
prove that qHz; < q
H
L < q
H
z;.
Part (iii). The claim follows by di¤erentiation of (34) and (36). This yields @qiz;h=@z;h =
 qiz;h

1 + ln qiz;h

=
 
z;h   1

< 0 whenever qiz;h > 1, while @q
i
z;h=@z;h = 0 whenever q
i
z;h = 1:
Proof of Lemma 4. To compute (11) and (12), note that total exports by sector z from
country v are Xz;v = Hz;vwh + (1   )Lz;v, hence aggregate exports by country v are Xv =
wh
R
Z 
H
z;v dz + (1   )
R
Z 
L
z;v dz. Now, notice that since z;l = , we must have that 
H
z;l = 
H
L
and Lz;l = 
L
L, for all (z; l) 2 Z  L. Plugging these expressions into (10) then yields (11).
Moreover, since all h obtain their draws of z;h from independent U

; 

distributions, and since
all Hz;h are well-dened functions of z;h, by the law of large numbers it follows that
R
Z 
H
z;h dz andR
Z 
L
z;h dz must both yield an identical value for every country h 2 H. Using these expressions, in
conjunction with those for Xz;v and Xv, and denoting HH 
R
Z 
H
z;h dz and 
L
H 
R
Z 
L
z;h dz, into
(10) then leads to (12).
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows from noting that: (a) both Hz;h and 
L
z;h in (12) are
functions of z;h; (b) Proposition 2 implies that @
H
z;h=@z;h < 0 and @
L
z;h=@z;h < 0; (c) 
H
H and
LH represent average demand intensities, hence 
H
z; < 
H
H < 
H
z; and 
L
z; < 
L
H < 
L
z;; and (d)
from (11), it follows that RCAz;h = RCAz;l only if Hz;h = 
H
H and 
L
z;h = 
L
H .
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i). Our claim immediately follows from part (iii) of Proposition
2 in conjunction with (21), since the distribution of demand intensities across goods and varieties
mirrors that of the levels of the optimally selected qualities.
Part (ii). Using (35) and (36), together with (21), for a consumer from H we get:
ln (1 + )  lnA =  z;h   1 lnHz;h + z;h lnH + z;h, for all (z; h) 2 ZH:
= (   1) lnHz;l +  lnH   lnwh + , for all (z; l) 2 Z L:
Similarly, considering (33) and (34) together with (21), in the case of a consumer from L we obtain:
ln (1 + )  lnA =  z;h   1 lnLz;h + z;h lnL + lnwh + z;h   Lz;h, for all (z; h) 2 ZH:
= (   1) lnLz;l +  lnL +    LL, for all (z; l) 2 Z L:
On the one hand, equating the rst expression of the each case, simplifying and rearranging:
lnHz;h   lnLz;h =
z;h
 
lnL   lnH+ lnwh   Lz;h 
z;h   1
  kz;h:
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Getting rid of the logs, we then obtain Hz;h = e
kz;hLz;h, and hence:
Hz;h   Lz;h =

ekz;h   1

Lz;h:
Consider now two producers h0; h00 2 H such that z;h0 < z;h00 . Since Lz;h0   Lz;h00 < Hz;h0   Hz;h00
requires Hz;h00   Lz;h00 < Hz;h0   Lz;h0 , and from part (i) of this proof it follows that Lz;h00 < Lz;h0 ,
we are left to prove that kz;h00  kz;h0 . Suppose kz;h00 > kz;h0 . Since by assumption z;h0 < z;h00 ,
and part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies Lz;h0  Lz;h00 , a necessary condition for this to hold is 
z;h00   z;h0
  
lnL   lnH > 0. But this is impossible, since lnH > lnL. So it must be that
kz;h00  kz;h0 , hence Lz;h0   Lz;h00 < Hz;h0   Hz;h00 .
On the other hand, equating the second expression of each case, simplifying and rearranging:
lnHz;l   lnLz;l =

 
lnL   lnH+ lnwh   LL
   1  kz;l:
We can thus write Hz;l Lz;l =
 
ekz;l   1Lz;l and, following an analogous reasoning, it is straight-
forward to obtain Lz;   Lz;l < Hz;   Hz;l (and Lz;l   Lz; < Hz;l   Hz;).
B Cross-country inequality in a multi-region world
We now consider a setup where the world is composed by K > 2 regions, indexed by k = 1; :::;K.
We let Vk denote the subset of countries from region k, where Vk has Lebesgue measure k > 0. In
addition, we let each country in region k be denoted by a particular vk. (All the results discussed
in this section are formalised in the Online Appendix, Section B.)
We assume that for any vk and every z, each z;vk is independently drawn from a uniform
distribution with support over [k; ], where k < . To keep the consistency with the previous
sections, let k =  when k = 1. In addition, let k0 < k00 for any two regions k
0 < k00. In
other words, we are indexing regions k = 1; :::;K in terms of rst-order stochastic dominance of
their respective uniform distributions. All uniform distributions are assumed to share the same
upper-bound , while they di¤er in their lower-bounds k.
In this extended setup, equilibrium wages display an analogous structure as the one described
in Proposition 6. Namely, in equilibrium, the wage in each vk is wk. In addition, equilibrium wages
are such that w1 > ::: > wk0 > ::: > wK , where 1 < k0 < K.
Notice that, since all individuals from the same region earn the same wages, they choose
identical consumption proles. We then let jz;vk denote the demand intensity by a consumer from
region Vj for good (z; vk). Once again, this immediately implies that IP jz;v = jz;v. Furthermore,
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it follows that, for a country vk:
Xz;vk =
KX
j=1
jwj
j
z;vk
:
In equilibrium, it must be the case that Xvk = wk for all vk 2 Vk. In addition, Wz equal for all z
is still true in this extended setup. As a result, the RCA of country vk in good z is given by:
RCAz;vk =
PK
j=1 jwj
j
z;vk
wk
: (40)
Since wages di¤er across regions, once again, we cannot nd a monotonic relationship between
RCAz;vk in (40) and the productivity draws z;vk when all countries in the world are pooled
together. However, we can still nd a result analogous to Proposition 3. In particular, it is still
true that the highest value of RCAz;vk corresponds to the country in region V1 receiving the best
possible draw in sector z. That is, RCAz;vk is the highest for some country v1 with z;v1 = .
Lastly, concerning import penetration, this extension also yields a result that is analogous to
that in Proposition 4. Following the notation in Proposition 4, we can show that 1z; > ::: >
k
0
z; > ::: > 
K
z;, where 1 < k
0 < K. Again, this result stems from our nonhomothetic structure
along the quality dimension, which implies that richer consumers allocate a larger share of their
spending in good z to the producers who can most e¢ ciently o¤er higher qualities versions of z.
39
References
[1] Alcala, F. (2012). Specialization Across Goods and Product Quality, Mimeo, University of Murcia.
[2] Bastos, P. and Silva, J. (2010). The Quality of a Firms Exports: Where you export to matters,
Journal of International Economics, vol. 82, pp. 99-111.
[3] Bergstrand, J. (1990). The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model, The Linder Hypothesis and the Deter-
minants of Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade, Economic Journal, vol. 100, pp. 1216-1229.
[4] Breinlich, H. and Cuñat, A. (2013). Geography, non-homotheticity, and industrialization: A quanti-
tative analysis, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 103, pp. 133-153.
[5] Brooks, E. (2006). Why dont rms export more? Product quality and Colombian plants, Journal of
Development Economics, vol. 80, pp. 160-178.
[6] Chen, N. and Juvenal, L. (2014). Quality, trade, and exchange rate pass-through, Working Paper No.
14/42, International Monetary Fund.
[7] Choi, Y. C., Hummels, D. and Xiang, C. (2009). Explaining Import Quality: The Role of the Income
Distribution, Journal of International Economics, vol. 77, pp. 265-275.
[8] Crino, R. and Epifani, P. (2012). Productivity, Quality and Export Behavior, Economic Journal, vol.
122, pp. 1206-1243.
[9] Crozet, M., Head, K. and Mayer, T. (2012). Quality Sorting and Trade: Firm-level evidence for French
wine, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, pp. 609-644.
[10] Dalgin, M., Trindade, V. and Mitra, D. (2008). Inequality, Nonhomothetic Preferences, and Trade: A
Gravity Approach, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 74, pp. 747-774.
[11] Dhingra, S. and Morrow, J. (2012). Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity under
rm heterogeneity, Mimeo, London School of Economics.
[12] Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S. and Samuelson, P. (1977). Comparative Advantage, Trade, and Payments
in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods, American Economic Review, vol. 67, pp. 823-839.
[13] Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2002). Technology, geography, and trade, Econometrica, vol. 70, pp. 1741-
1779.
40
[14] Fajgelbaum, P., Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (2011). Income Distribution, Product Quality, and
International Trade, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 119, pp. 721-765.
[15] Feenstra, R. and Romalis, J. (2012). International Prices and Endogenous Quality, NBER Working
Papers 18314.
[16] Fieler, A. C. (2011). Nonhomotheticity and Bilateral Trade: Evidence and a Quantitative Explana-
tion, Econometrica, vol. 79, pp. 1069-1101.
[17] Fieler, A. C. (2012). Quality Di¤erentiation in International Trade: theory and evidence, Mimeo,
University of Pennsylvania.
[18] Flach, L. (2014). Quality upgrading and price heterogeneity: Evidence from Brazilian exporters,
Mimeo.
[19] Flam, H. and Helpman, E. (1987). Vertical Product Di¤erentiation and North-South Trade, American
Economic Review, vol. 77, pp. 810-822.
[20] Foellmi, R., Hepenstrick, C. and Zweimuller, J. (2012). The Threat of Parallel Imports and the
Extensive Margin of International Trade, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7939.
[21] Francois, J. and Kaplan, S. (1996). Aggregate Demand Shifts, Income Distribution, and the Linder
Hypothesis, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 78, pp. 244-250.
[22] Gaulier, G. and Zignago, S. (2010). BACI: International Trade Database at the Product-level. The
1994-2007 Version, CEPII Working Paper 2010-23.
[23] Hallak, J. C. (2006). Product Quality and the Direction of Trade, Journal of International Economics,
vol. 68, pp. 238-265.
[24] Hallak, J. C. (2010). A Product-Quality View of the Linder Hypothesis, Review of Economics and
Statistics, vol. 92, pp. 453-466.
[25] Hallak, J. C. and Schott, P. (2011). Estimating Cross-Country Di¤erences in Product Quality, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, vol. 126, pp. 417-474.
[26] Hunter, L. (1991). The contribution of nonhomothetic preferences to trade, Journal of International
Economics, vol. 30, pp. 345-358.
[27] Iacovone, L. and Javorcik, B. (2008). Shipping Good Tequila out: Investment, Domestic Unit Values
and Entry of Multi-Product Plants into Export Markets, Mimeo, Oxford University.
41
[28] Jaimovich, E. and Merella, V. (2012). Quality Ladders in a Ricardian Model of Trade with Nonhomo-
thetic Preferences, Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 10, pp. 908-937.
[29] Jaimovich, E. and Merella, V. (2013). Love for Quality, Comparative Advantage, and Trade, Carlo
Alberto Notebooks, no. 216.
[30] Kugler, M. and Verhoogen, E. (2012). Prices, Plant Size, and Product Quality, Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 79, pp. 307-339.
[31] Khandelwal, A. (2010). The long and short (of) quality ladders, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 77,
1450-76.
[32] Linder, S. (1961). An Essay on Trade and Transformation, Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell.
[33] Manova, K. and Zhang, Z. (2012). Export Prices across Firms and Destinations, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol. 127, pp. 379-436.
[34] Markusen, J. (1986). Explaining the Volume of Trade: an Eclectic Approach, American Economics
Review, vol. 76, pp. 1002-1011.
[35] Matsuyama, K. (2000). A Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods under Nonhomothetic Prefer-
ences: Demand Complementarities, Income Distribution, and North-South Trade, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 108, pp. 1093-1120.
[36] Mayer, T. and Zignago, S. (2006). GeoDist: the CEPIIs Distances and Geographical Database,
MPRA Paper 31243.
[37] Melitz, M. J. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2008). Market size, trade, and productivity, Review of Economic
studies, vol. 75, pp. 295-316.
[38] Murphy, K. and Shleifer, A. (1997). Quality and Trade, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 53,
pp. 1-15.
[39] Schott, P. (2004). Across-Product versus within-Product Specialization in International Trade, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, vol. 119, pp.647-678.
[40] Simonovska, I. (2015). Income Di¤erences and Prices of Tradables: Insights from an Online Retailer,
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
[41] Stokey, N. (1991). The Volume and Composition of Trade between Rich and Poor Countries, Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 58, pp. 63-80.
42
[42] Tarasov, A. (2012). Trade Liberalization and Welfare Inequality: a Demand-Based Approach, Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 114, 1296-1317.
[43] Verhoogen, E. (2008). Trade, Quality Upgrading and Wage Inequality in the Mexican Manufacturing
Sector, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 123, pp 489-530.
[44] Zhelobodko, E., Kokovin, S., Parenti, M. and Thisse, J. F. (2012). Monopolistic competition: Beyond
the constant elasticity of substitution, Econometrica, vol. 80, pp. 2765-2784.
43
Online Appendix
A Additional theoretical results
A.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Proposition 5 Suppose that, for each commodity (z; v) 2 ZV, z;v is independently drawn from
a uniform density function with support

; 

. Then, for any  > 0, in equilibrium: wv = w for
all v 2 V.
Proof. Existence of equilibrium: As a rst step, we prove that wv = w for all v 2 V is an
equilibrium of the model. Firstly, notice that when wi = w for all i 2 V, the Lagrange multipliers
will be identical for all countries, and in particular we may write i =  for all i 2 V. Secondly,
using Lemma 1, when wv = w for all v 2 V, conditions in (16) together with (21) and i =  for
all i 2 V, lead to:
qiz;v = qz;v =

1 + 
Aez;v
1=(z;v 1)
; (41)
iz;v = z;v =

1 + 
A (e)z;v
1=(z;v 1)
: (42)
Now, recall that each z;v is drawn from from an independent uniform probability distribution with
support

; 

. Hence, by the law of large numbers, for each country v 2 V, the (innite) sequence
of draws

z;v
	
z2Z will also be uniformly distributed over

; 

along the goods space. This
implies that, integrating over Z and bearing in mind (42),
R
Z 
i
z;v dz =
R
Z z;v dz = v =  > 0, for
each good v 2 V. Next, replacing RZ iz;v dz =  into (19), and swapping the order of integration,
we obtain
R
V  dv = 1, which in turn implies that  = 1 since V has unit mass. Then, it is easy to
check that all conditions (8) hold simultaneously when wv = w for all v 2 V.
Equilibrium uniqueness: We now proceed to prove the above equilibrium is unique. Normalise
w = 1, and suppose for a subset J  V of countries with measure j > 0 we have wj > 1, while
for a (disjoint) subset K  V of countries with measure k > 0 we have wk < 1. Denote nally
by I  V the (complementary) subset of countries with wi = 1. Consider some k 2 K, i 2 I, and
j 2 J , and take (zk; k) ; (zi; i) ; (zj ; j) such that: zk;k = zi;i = zj ;j = . Notice that, due to the
law of large numbers, for any  2  ;  the measure of good-variety couples for which the last
condition is satised is the same in k, i and j.
As a rst step, take country i 2 I. (16) and (17) imply that, for (zk; k), (zi; i) and (zj ; j), we must
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have, respectively:
ln (1 + )  lnA =  ln  i+ ln (wk) + (   1) ln(izk;k) +    izk;k
=  ln
 
i

+ (   1) ln(i
zi;i
) +    izi;i
=  ln
 
i

+ ln (wj) + (   1) ln(izj ;j ) +    
i
zj ;j :
Notice also from (18) and (21) that if iz;v > 0, then ln
i
z;v
=   lni, whereas if iz;v = 0, then
lni
z;v
   lni. Then, i
zk;k
 i
zi;i
 i
zj ;j
.
As a second step, take country k 2 K. (16) and (17) imply that, for (zk; k), (zi; i) and (zj ; j), we
must have, respectively:
ln (1 + )  lnA =  ln(k) + (   1) ln(k
zk;k
) +    kzk;k
=  ln(k) + ln

1
wk

+ (   1) ln(k
zi;i
) +    kzi;i
=  ln(k) + ln

wj
wk

+ (   1) ln(k
zj ;j
) +    kzj ;j :
Following an analogous reasoning as before, it follows that k
zk;k
 k
zi;i
 k
zj ;j
.
As a third step, take country j 2 J , and notice wj > 1. (16) and (17) imply that, for (zk; k), (zi; i)
and (zj ; j), we must have, respectively:
ln (1 + )  lnA =  ln  j+ lnwk
wj

+ (   1) ln(j
zk;k
) +    jzk;k
=  ln
 
j

+ ln

1
wj

+ (   1) ln(j
zi;i
) +    jzi;k
=  ln
 
j

+ (   1) ln(j
zj ;j
) +    jzj ;j :
Again, an analogous reasoning as in the previous cases leads to j
zk;k
 j
zi;i
 j
zj ;j
:
Finally, integrate among the good space Z and country space V. The above results lead to:
jwj
Z
Z
j
z;k
dz + kwk
Z
Z
k
z;k
dz +
 
1  j   k Z
Z
i
z;k
dz 
jwj
Z
Z
j
z;i
dz + kwk
Z
Z
k
z;i
dz +
 
1  j   k Z
Z
i
z;i
dz 
jwj
Z
Z
j
z;j
dz + kwk
Z
Z
k
z;j
dz +
 
1  j   k Z
Z
i
z;j
dz:
(43)
Note that the rst line in (43) equals the world spending on commodities produced in k, the second
equals the world spending on commodities produced in i, and the third equals the world spending
on commodities produced in j. However, when wk < 1 < wj , those inequalities are inconsistent
with market clearing conditions (8). As a result, there cannot exist an equilibrium with measure
j > 0 of countries with wj > 1 and/or a measure k > 0 of countries with wk < 1.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that the set V is composed by two disjoint subsets with positive measure:
H and L. Assume that: a) for any (z; h) 2 Z H, z;h is independently drawn uniform density
function with support

; 

; b) for any (z; l) 2 Z  L, z;l = . Then, for any h; h0; h00 2 H and
l; l0; l00 2 L: (i) wh0 = wh00; (ii) wl0 = wl00; (iii) wh > wl.
Proof. We prove the proposition in di¤erent steps. We rst prove that, if an equilibrium exists,
then it must necessarily be the case that, for any h; h0; h00 2 H and l; l0; l00 2 L: 1) wh 6= wl; 2)
wh0 = wh00 and wl0 = wl00 ; 3) wh=wl > 1; 4) wh=wl <1. Lastly, we prove that a unique equilibrium
exists, with: 5) 1 < wh=wl <1.
Preliminarily, consider a generic country i 2 V, and compute the aggregate demand by i for goods
produced in country v 2 V. From the rst-order conditions, it follows that:
iz;v = max
(
(1 + ) (wi=wv)
A (ei)z;v
 1
z;v 1
;
1
i
)
: (44)
Hence, total demand by i for goods produced in h 2 H and in l 2 L are respectively given by:Z
Z
iz;hwi dz = wi
Z 

max
(
1 + 
A (ei)
wi
wh
1=( 1)
;
1
i
)
1
   d; for any h 2 H; (45)
and Z
Z
iz;l wi dz = wi max
8<:
 
1 + 
A (ei)
wi
wl
!1=( 1)
;
1
i
9=; ; for any l 2 L: (46)
Step 1. Suppose now that, in equilibrium, wi = w for all i 2 V. Recalling the proof of Lemma
1, we can observe that the constraints qiz;v  1 will not bind in this case. Demand intensities
in (44) are then given by iz;v = z;v = (e  ) z;v=(z;v 1) [(1 + ) =A]1=(z;v 1) for all i 2 V.
As a result, the value in (45) must be strictly larger than the value in (46), since the term
[(1 + ) =A]1=( 1) ==( 1) is strictly decreasing in . As a consequence, given that i represents
a generic country in V, integrating over the set V, it follows that the world demand for goods
produced in a country from H will be strictly larger than the world demand for goods produced
in a country from L. But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions, which require
that world demand is equal for all v 2 V. Hence, wv = w for all v 2 V cannot hold in equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that, in equilibrium, wh0 > wh00 for some h0; h00 2 H. Computing (45) respectively
for h0 and h00 yields:
wi
Z 

max
(
1 + 
A (ei)
wi
wh0
 1
 1
;
1
i
)
1
   d  wi
Z 

max
(
1 + 
A (ei)
wi
wh00
 1
 1
;
1
i
)
1
   d
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Now, since i represents a generic country in V, integrating over the set V, it follows that the
world demand for goods produced in country h0 will be no larger than the world demand for goods
produced in country h00. But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions, which require
that world demand for goods produced in country h0 must be strictly larger than world demand
for goods produced in country h00. Furthermore, an analogous reasoning rules out wh0 < wh00 .
As a consequence, it must be the case that, if an equilibrium exists, it must be characterised by
wh0 = wh00 for any h0; h00 2 H. (Similarly, it can be proved that, if an equilibrium exists, it must
be characterised by wl0 = wl00 for any l0; l00 2 L.)
Step 3. Suppose that wh < wl. Since

[(1 + ) =A] (wi=wv) =
 
i
	1=( 1) is strictly decreasing
in , it follows that the value in (46) is no larger than the value in (45). Moreover, since i
represents a generic country in V, integrating over the set V, we obtain that the world demand for
goods produced in a country from region L is no larger than world demand for goods produced
in a country from region H. But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions when
wh < wl, which require that world demand for goods produced in a country from region L must
be strictly larger than world demand for goods produced in a country from region H.
Step 4. As a result of steps 1, 2 and 3, our only remaining candidate for an equilibrium is then
wh > wl. From (45), it follows that the aggregate demand by any h0 2 H for goods produced
in region H coincides with its aggregate supply to the same region. Hence, there must be no net
surplus within region H. Analogously, from (46) it follows that there must be no net surplus within
region L. As a result, a necessary condition for market clearing is that the aggregate demand by
region L for goods produced in region H must equal the aggregate demand by region H for goods
produced in region L. Formally:Z
L
Z
H
Z
Z
l
0
z;hwl0 dz dh dl
0 =
Z
H
Z
L
Z
Z
h
0
z;l wh0 dz dl dh
0 (47)
Suppose now that wh ! 1. Then, on the one hand, from (45) we obtain the aggregate demand
by l0 2 L for goods produced in region H would be equal to a nite (non-negative) number. Since
this would hold true for every l0 2 L, then the aggregate demand by region L for goods produced
in region H  left-hand side of (47) would be equal to a nite (non-negative) number. On the
other hand, from (45) it follows that when wh ! 1 the aggregate demand by h0 2 H for goods
produced in any l 2 L would tend to innity. Since this would hold true for every h0 2 H and
l 2 L, then the aggregate demand by region H for goods produced in region L  right-hand side
of (47) would also tend to innity. But this then is inconsistent with the equality required by
condition (47). Hence, if an equilibrium exists, it must be then characterised by wl < wh <1.
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Step 5. Finally, we prove now that there exists an equilibrium 1 < wh=wl < 1, and this
equilibrium is unique. Recall that wh=wl represents the relative wage between region H and region
L. Step 1 shows that, should the relative wage equal one, then the world demand for goods
produced in a country from H would be strictly larger than the world demand for goods produced
in a country from L. Step 4 shows instead that, should wh !1, then the world demand for goods
produced in a country from H would be strictly smaller than the world demand for goods produced
in a country from L. Consider now (44) for any v = h, and notice that the demand intensities iz;h
are all non-increasing in wh=wl. In addition, consider (44) for any v = l, and notice that in this
case the iz;l are all non-decreasing in wh=wl, while they are strictly increasing in wh=wl for at least
some z 2 Z when i 2 H. Therefore, taking all this into account, together with the expressions
in (45) and (46), it follows that the world demand for goods produced in a country from L may
increase with wh=wl, while world demand for goods produced in a country from H will decrease
with wh=wl. Hence, by continuity, there must necessarily exist some 1 < wh=wl < 1 consistent
with all market clearing conditions holding simultaneously. In addition, this equilibrium must then
also be unique.
A.2 Formalisation of results discussed in Appendix B
Proposition 7 Suppose that the set V is composed by K disjoint subsets, indexed by k = 1; :::;K,
each denoted by Vk  V and with Lebesgue measure k > 0. Assume that for any country vk 2 Vk
each z;vk is independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support [k; ], with k0 < k00
for k0 < k00.Then: w1 > ::: > wk0 > ::: > wK , where 1 < k0 < K.
Proof. Combining (16) and (17), yields:
iz;v = max
(
1 + 
A

wi
wv
 
e  i z;v1=(z;v 1) ; 1
i
)
 i  z;v; wv : (48)
Notice from (48) that @i
 
z;v; wv

=@z;v  0 and @i
 
z;v; wv

=@wv  0.
Consider now two generic regions k0 < k00, and suppose that wk0  wk00 . Since the distribution
of z;k0 FOSD the distribution of z;k00 , then it follows that
R
Z 
i
z;k0dz 
R
Z 
i
z;k00dz. Moreover,
recalling the proof of Lemma 1 it follows that the iz;v in (48) must be strictly decreasing in z;v
and in wv at least in one of all the regions in the world.29 As a result, there will exist a positive
measure of countries for which
R
Z 
i
z;k0dz >
R
Z 
i
z;k00dz when wk0  wk00 . Therefore, integrating
29More precisely, it must be that the iz;v in (48) are strictly decreasing in z;v and wv at least in region k
, such
that wk 2 maxfw1; :::; wKg. That is, the region (or regions) exhibiting with the highest wage.
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over the set V, we obtain that
R
V
R
Z 
i
z;k0dz >
R
V
R
Z 
i
z;k00dz. That is, the world demand for goods
produced in a country from region k0 is strictly larger than world demand for goods produced
in a country from region k00. But this is inconsistent with the market clearing conditions when
wk0  wk00 , which require that world demand for goods produced in a country from region k0 must
be no larger than world demand for goods produced in a country from region k00. As a consequence,
it must be that wk0 > wk00 .
Proposition 8 For country v1 2 V1 such that z;v1 =  and any country vk 2 Vk such that
z;vk = k and k 6= 1: RCAz;v1 > RCAz;vk , for any z 2 Z.
Proof. Countries with identical incomes have identical budget shares. Let jz;v denote the common
budget share for (z; v) in j. Then, from the denition of total production of good z by country v,
we have that Xz;v =
PK
j=1 j
j
 
z;v; wv

wj . Notice also that Xv = wv and Wz=W = 1. Hence,
(10) yields:
RCAz;v =
PK
j=1 j
j
 
z;v; wv

wj
wv
: (49)
Consider a generic good z 2 Z and, without loss of generality, select countries: v1 2 V1 such that
z;v1 = ; and vk 2 Vk from any region k 2 (1;K] such that z;vk = k. From (49) we obtain that
RCAz;v1 > RCAz;vk requires:PK
j=1 j
j
 
; w1

wj
w1
>
PK
j=1 j
j (k; wk)wj
wk
: (50)
Notice too that market clearing conditions imply:
Z
Z
24 KX
j=1
j
j
 
z;1; w1

wj
35 dz = w1 and Z
Z
24 KX
j=1
j
j
 
z;k; wk

wj
35 dz = wk:
Therefore, it follows that
R
ZRCAz;v1dz =
R
ZRCAz;vkdz = 1: We can transform the integrals over
z in integrals over , to obtain:
1
   
Z 

[RCA;v1 ] d = 1; (51)
1
   k
Z 
k
[RCA;vk ] d = 1 (52)
Recall that @j () =@ < 0; implying that @ (RCA;v) =@ < 0: Moreover, since wk < w1; no-
tice that it must be the case that RCA;vk > RCA;v1 for any  2 [k; ]. Now, suppose that
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RCAk;vk  RCA;v1 , then bearing in mind that @2j () = (@)2 > 0 and @2j () = (@@wv) > 0,
we can observe that when (52) holds true then
1
   
Z 

[RCA;v1 ] d < 1;
which contradicts (51). Therefore, it must be the case that RCAk;vk < RCA;v1 .
Proposition 9 Let jz; denote the demand intensity by a consumer from region j 2 Vj for the
variety of good z produced in country v1 such that z;v1 = . Then: 
1
z; > ::: > 
j0
z; > ::: > 
K
z;,
where 1 < j0 < K.
Proof. Consider a pair of generic consumers from regions j0 and j00, where j0 < j00 . In addition,
consider a pair of generic exporters from countries vk0 and vk00 , where k0  k00. Following an
analogous procedure as in the proof of Proposition 4, combining (16) and (17) of consumers j0 and
j00 for the varieties of good z produced in vk0 and vk00 , we may obtain:
z;vk00   z;vk0

ln

j
0
=j
00

+

j
00
z;vk0   j
0
z;vk0

+

j
00
z;vk00   j
0
z;vk00

=
z;vk0   1

ln

j
0
z;vk0=
j00
z;vk0

+

z;vk00   1

ln

j
00
z;vk00=
j0
z;vk00

:
(53)
Since ln

j
0
=j
00

> 0 and j
00
z;vk
 j0z;vk , from (53) it follows that j
0
z;vk0=
j00
z;vk0 > 
j0
z;vk00=
j00
z;vk00
when z;vk0 < z;vk00 . Now, let k
0 = 1 and pick z such that z;v1 = . Next, suppose 
j0
z;  j
00
z;.
Then, we must have that j
0
z;v  j
00
z;v for all (z; v) 2 Z V, with strict inequality for all (z; v)
such that z;vk > . However, since the budget constraints of consumer j
0 and j00 require thatR
Z
R
V 
j0
z;v dv dz =
R
Z
R
V 
j00
z;v dv dz, then 
j0
z;  j
00
z; cannot possibly be true.
A.3 Trade frictions and consumer loss
Consider country i as an importer of good z. We assume this commodity is subject to a tari¤
tz > 0 applied on the (free-on-board) price of imports, regardless of the quality level in which it
is imported by i. Since the tari¤ is applied only to one (atomless) sector within a continuum of
sectors, we can disregard general equilibrium e¤ects as they would be negligible. Given the tari¤
tz, the nal price at which good z sourced from a generic country v 6= i will be sold to consumers
in country i will be:
piz;v (q) = (1 + tz)Aq
z;vwv= (1 + ) : (54)
Recall the utility function of the individual (3), and focus on the sub-utility derived from the
consumption of good z sourced from country v. Let us write this sub-utility as uz;v = ln (cz;v)
qz;v .
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Bearing in mind (54), and considering that, in the optimum:
qiz;v (tz) =

1 + 
1 + tz
1
AQie
z;v
wi
wv
1=(z;v 1)
; (55)
and iz;v = q
i
z;v=Qi, then uz;v boils down to:
uz;v = z;v

1 + 
1 + tz
1
AQie
z;v
wi
wv
 1
z;v 1
: (56)
Let us denote by  iv (tz) the utility loss due to imposing an import tari¤ tz > 0 relative to the
case where tz = 0. From (56), we get:
 iv (tz) = z;v

1 + 
AQie
z;v
wi
wv
 1
z;v 1

1  (1 + tz) 
1
z;v 1

: (57)
It is plain from (57) that  iv(tz) > 0 whenever tz > 0, and that @ 
i
v () =@tz > 0.
More interesting is studying how the tari¤ loss function behaves at di¤erent levels of income of
the importer. Using (57), we may compute the elasticity of  iv(tz) with respect to wi, to obtain:
@ ln  iv(tz)
@ lnwi
=
1
z;v   1
> 0: (58)
This result implies that the utility loss due to the tari¤ is greater for richer consumers. Moreover,
this di¤erence in welfare loss between richer and poorer importers becomes greater when the tari¤
is imposed on more e¢ cient producers of good z (i.e., when the tari¤ is imposed on countries that
received a lower z;v).
Our model then yields the following two qualitative welfare loss results. First, the consumer
loss due to import tari¤s is always greater for richer importers. Second, the loss disparity between
richer and poorer importers gets larger when the tari¤ is imposed on more e¢ cient producers of
good z. These two results crucially rest on our nonhomothetic preference structure (in Section A.5
below we show that these two results vanish away in the presence of homothetic preferences).
Lastly, we can use some of the above expressions to get a sense of the relative magnitude of
welfare loss due to the tari¤ implied by our model. Bearing in mind (58), from (55) we can observe
that:
@ ln qiz;v
@ lnwi
=
1
z;v   1
=
@ ln  iv(tz)
@ lnwi
: (59)
Interestingly, the magnitude of the left-hand side of this expression can be obtained from the
data by using unit values as a proxy for qiz;v. The pooled estimation of the log of unit values on the
log of importers income delivers a mean value of 0.075.30 This implies that a 10% richer importer
30We conduct our pooled regression using the data on value of imports and quantity of imports by product at
the 6-digit Harmonised System (HS-6) level of disaggregation in year 2009. Our regression includes a full set of
product-exporter dummies. Full details of this regression are available from the authors upon request.
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will su¤er a 0.75% higher welfare loss when importing good z from the average producer.31 If we
add (subtract) one standard deviation to the estimate, the welfare loss su¤ered by a 10% richer
importer rises (declines) to 0.85% (0.65%).32
A.4 Sectoral subsidy and comparative advantage
Consider country v as a producer of good z, and assume that local producers of good z receive
a proportional subsidy z;v regardless of the quality level of their output. Since the subsidy is
applied only to one (atomless) sector within a continuum of sectors, we can disregard again general
equilibrium e¤ects as they would be negligible. Following an analogous reasoning as before, they
will sell their output to consumers of country i at price piz;v(q) = (1  z;v)Aqz;vwv= (1 + ). This,
in turn, implies that the share of income of consumers in country i spent on good z produced in
country v is given by:33
iz;v =

(1 + )
(1  z;v)A (ei)z;v
wi
wv
 1
z;v 1
: (60)
Let Sz;v denote the share of sector z in the total GDP of country v. Bearing in mind that, in
this simplied version of the model, there are two countries in region L (with income wl) and two
countries in region H (with income wh), it follows that:
Sz;v =
2
wv
 
wh
H
z;v + wl
L
z;v

: (61)
Di¤erentiating (60) with respect to z;v yields:
diz;v
dz;v
=
iz;v 
z;v   1

(1  z;v)
> 0: (62)
The impact of a subsidy to sector z in country v on its the GDP share can be obtained by
di¤erentiating (61) with respect to z;v while bearing in mind (62). Thus,
dSz;v
dz;v
=
2
wv
 
wh
dHz;v
dz;v
+ wl
dLz;v
dz;v
!
: (63)
31Using (59), we can back out the implied value of the sectoral productivity draw for the average producer,
^ = 14:33. Performing a similar pooled regression analysis as the one we do here, but including a panel of transactions
instead of data for year 2009 only, Fieler (2012, Table 2) obtains an estimate equal to 0.06. According to her
estimate (which is just slightly smaller in magnitude than ours), the sectoral productivity of average producer would
be ^ = 17:67.
32Again, using (59), the implied value of the sectoral productivity draw for the more (less) productive exporter
when we add (subtract) one standard deviation to the estimated value is ^ = 12:76 (^ = 16:38). Repeating this
exercise for a two standard deviations di¤erence, we obtain a 1.05% (0.45%) higher welfare loss, corresponding to
sectoral a sectoral productivity draw for the exporter of ^ = 10:52 (^ = 23:22)
33Notice that when i = v then iz;v refers to domestic sales of good z.
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Let us now compare the impact of the subsidy z;v on the sectoral share Sz;v for the case of a
country in region L (which, by construction, must have received  as productivity draw in sector
z) and the country in region H that received  as productivity draw in sector z. That is, we are
computing the derivative (63) for two economies with di¤erent wages in the denominator (wl and
wh, respectively), but both sharing the same elasticity of quality upgrading z;v = . Notice now
that both dHz;v=dz;v and d
L
z;v=dz;v are always larger in a country from region L than in the
country from region H that received the productivity draw z;v = . Therefore, the e¤ect of z;v
on Sz;v will be larger in the country from region L than in the country from region H that received
the productivity draw z;v = . This uneven e¤ect of the subsidy across producers with di¤erent
incomes rests crucially on our non-homothetic preference structure, as it is shown next in Section
A.5.
A.5 Homothetic preferences
We now introduce an alternative preference specication, designed to deliver homothetic demand
schedules. For the remaining of this appendix, to streamline the illustration it proves convenient to
exploit the ordinal nature of the quality ladders and apply the following monotonic transformation
to the quality index: ~qz;v = ln qz;v. This transformation comes at no loss of generality since the
result derived here would obtain even without such transformation.34
Suppose that preferences, while retaining the same structure across goods, are for each good
now represented by the sub-utility index:
uz;v = ln(~qz;vcz;v):
This index replaces the expression ln (cz;v)
qz;v in (3). The rest of the model remains unchanged.
Individuals choose the optimal values of quality and consumption to maximise that utility function
subject to (4). There, the pricing function in terms of ~qz;v becomes:
pz;v (~qz;v) =
Awv
1 + 
(qz;v)
z;v =
Awv
1 + 
 
e~qz;v
z;v = Awv
1 + 
ez;v ~qz;v : (64)
Following an analogous reasoning as the one used in Appendix A to solve the original consumer
i optimisation problem, we obtain the the (relevant) rst-order conditions:
1
~qiz;v
  z;v = 0; (65)
1

  
1
iz;v
  i = 0: (66)
34More precisely, all the homothetic results we show below will remain qualitatively unchanged if we keep ~q = q.
These additional results are available from the authors upon request.
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Note that (66) implies that budget shares are identical for all goods, wherever produced. Recalling
that budget shares must sum up to one, from (65) and (66) we can thus obtain the following two
expressions respectively identifying, for each good z and country v, the optimal quality level and
budget share:
~qiz;v =
1
z;v
; and iz;v = 1:
In the light of these ndings, we can show that the results discussed in Appendices A.3 and
A.4 vanish away once we modify the utility function to deliver homothetic preferences.
First, consider again (54), now expressed in terms of ~qiz;v:
pz;v (~qz;v) = (1 + tz)Ae
~qz;vz;vwv= (1 + ) : (67)
Using the sub-utility index uz;v = ln(~qiz;vc
i
z;v), replacing c
i
z;v = 
i
z;vwi=pz;v (~qz;v) and then pz;v (~qz;v)
by (67) and ~qz;v and iz;v by their optimal values, we obtain the welfer loss function:
uz;v =   ln z;v + ln

1 + 
1 + tz
1
eA
wi
wv

:
Di¤erentiating with respect to tz yields @uz;v=@tz =   (1 + tz) 1 < 0, from which it is easy to
observe that the value of the derivative in (58) in this case equals zero.35 This implies that the
utility loss due to the tari¤ is now independent of consumersincome. In other words, di¤erently
from our model with nonhomothetic preferences, in the presence of homothetic preferences (i.e.,
when willingness to pay for quality is constant), the utility loss due to the import tari¤ is the same
for all individuals, regardless their income level.
Second, recalling the denition of Sz;v in (61), from the fact that z;v = 1 it straightforwardly
follows that the derivatives in (62), and therefore in (63), are in this case equal to zero. This
implies that the e¤ect of a subsidy on the share of sector z in the total GDP is now independent
of the region to which country v belongs.
35Note that the welfare loss function is this case reads  iv (tz) = ln (1 + tz), from which @ 
i
v (tz) =@wi = 0 straight-
forwardly obtains.
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